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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Fair Housing’s Third Act:
American Tragedy or Triumph
Heather R. Abraham
Fifty two years a o, Con ress enacted a one of a kind civil ri hts
directive. t re uires every federal a ency and state and local rantees by
e tension to take affirmative steps to undo se re ation. n
, this
overlooked Fair Housin Act provision the affirmatively furtherin fair
housin or AFFH mandate had hei htened relevance. Perhaps most
visible was Donald rump s racially char ed protect the suburbs campai n
rhetoric. n an appeal to suburban constituents, his administration replaced a
race conscious fair housin rule with a no uestions asked re ulation that
elevates local control above civil ri hts.
he maneuver was especially stark as protesters marched in opposition to
systemic racism s many forms. n this moment of racial awakenin , it is critical
to revisit how nei hborhood se re ation affects nearly all aspects of American
life. We live in a racist ecosystem, and racial se re ation is its definin feature.
Se re ation s profound influence reinforces the importance of the AFFH
mandate as a remedial tool.
Drawin on recent events as a case study, this Article e amines the AFFH
mandate s potential to be our country s most effective anti se re ation tool.
First, this Article accounts for the mandate s historic failures. Second, it
demonstrates why the Act must be amended to instill a durable compliance
process at the local level.
As currently confi ured in statute, the mandate is profoundly inade uate
to meanin fully reduce se re ation. But if amended, it has the unleashed
power to reduce se re ation at the local level. his has critical real world
implications new studies reveal that even incremental reduction of
nei hborhood se re ation decidedly improves uality of life outcomes, from
education to health to life e pectancy.
Associate Professor and Director of the Civil Rights and Transparency Clinic,
State niversity of New York (S NY) at uffalo School of Law.
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Decades after Con ress announced the overnment s affirmative duty to
undo it, housin se re ation remains a profound collective problem that
merits the resources necessary to systematically dismantle it. he sta e is set
for fair housin s third act.
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FAIR HOUSING'S THIRD ACT

othin can be chan ed until it is faced.
ames aldwin
INTROD CTION
It’s a common refrain: residential integration has never been tried in the
nited States not on any meaningful scale. Cities remain hyper-segregated,
often as divided or worse than the 1960s.1 Its costs are staggering, spilling
over into all aspects of American life, from the racial wealth gap to social
determinants of health to GDP.2 Racial segregation affects all .S.
communities by defining the landscape of opportunity. Segregation opens
doors of opportunity to some and cruelly shuts them to others. Today, fiftytwo years after passage of the Fair Housing Act, racial segregation remains

1.

Douglas S. Massey, he Le acy of the
Fair Housin Act, 30 SOC. F. 578 83
( une 2015) (analy ing racial segregation from 1970 to 2010, and observing
that twenty-one metropolitan areas remained hyper-segregated in 2010) see
also DO GLAS S. MASSEY NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 60 82, 203 04
(1993) (documenting historical patterns from 1970-1980) Michael D. M.
ader Siri Warkentien, he Fra mented Evolution of Racial nte ration Since
the Civil Ri hts Movement, 3 SOC. SCI. 135 66 (2016) (documenting racial
change in four metropolitan areas) RICHARD SANDER, YANA A.
CHEVA
ONATHAN M. ZASLOFF, MOVING TOWARD INTEGRATION 1 10 (2018) (assessing the
state of segregation and describing the patterns that reinforce it).

2.

E. ., SANDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 335 52 (effects of segregation) Sam
Fulwood III, he Costs of Se re ation and the Benefits of the Fair Housin Act,
in THE FIGHT FOR FAIR HO SING 40 56 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2018) (domestic
and international empirical impact) Gregory Acs, et al., The Cost of
Segregation: National Trends and the Case of Chicago, 1990-2010, R AN INST.
https: www.urban.org research publication cost(March
2017),
(income,
https: perma.cc 256H-HCHE
segregation view full report
education, life expectancy, homicide rate) he Cost of Se re ation, METRO.
PLANNING CO NCIL 4 5 n.1 (March 2017), https: www.metroplanning.org
uploads cms documents cost-of-segregation.pdf https: perma.cc 5ALST M (gross domestic product) see also R.A. Hahn et al., Civil Ri hts as
Determinants of Public Health and Racial and Ethnic Health E uity Health
Care, Education, Employment, and Housin in the nited States, 4 SSM
POP LATION HEALTH
17 24
(2018),
https: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
pmc articles PMC5730086 pdf main.pdf https: perma.cc F7Z8-RM
(social determinants of health) RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 180 83
(2017) (racial wealth gap).
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a profound collective problem that merits the attention necessary to
systematically dismantle it as a matter of federal policy. 3
ut how This Article argues that we try something in earnest for the first
time: systematic residential desegregation at a local level, guided and
reinforced by federal law. To do so, we must first confront the reality that
the primary legal tool for reducing segregation the Fair Housing Act, as
currently configured is profoundly inadequate to the task. The Act
features an affirmative duty to use public resources to dismantle

3.

It is critical to situate the meaning of residential integration in the context
of the status quo. Some neighborhoods are starved of economic investment
while others hoard wealth and opportunity. Thus, integration as used in this
Article, is intended as a strategy not the only strategy to reduce placebased inequality. It is not intended as assimilationist. Likewise, separation
and segregation are not understood or intended as inherently
interchangeable concepts. Rather, this Article necessarily acknowledges, and
seeks to overcome, the reality that there are vast differences in access to
wealth and opportunity between segregated predominantly white and
segregated predominantly lack neighborhoods. For a discussion of space
racism, and the assumptions commonly associated with integration advocacy,
see I RAM . ENDI, HOW TO E AN ANTIRACIST 166 80 (2019).
Stokely Carmichael wrote in 1966 that integration is a subterfuge for the
maintenance of white supremacy premised on the complete acceptance
that blacks must move into a white neighborhood or send their children to a
white school, whereas he advocated for lack people to become equal in a
way that means something, and integration ceases to be a one-way street.
Stokely Carmichael, What We Want, N.Y. REV. OO S (Sept. 22, 1966). This
tension between mobility-based integration and place-based community
development persists a half-century later. See enerally, EDWARD GOETZ, THE
ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION (2019) see also infra note 222 (discussing the
balanced approach that seeks to bridge the divide between place-based
investment and mobility programs, a longstanding debate within the fair
housing community). In the same article, Carmichael offers a vision in which
integration does belong: when integration doesn’t mean draining skills and
energies from the ghetto into white neighborhoods . . . t hen integration
becomes relevant. Carmichael, supra.
This Article sits in that tension. Its integration-focused proposals are best
viewed as an attempt at pragmatic policymaking that seeks to achieve the
equitable distribution of resources across neighborhoods, inherently
constrained by the existing legal framework and political will, among other
limitations.

4

FAIR HOUSING'S THIRD ACT

segregation, known as the affirmatively further fair housing or AFFH
mandate.4
Despite this powerful mandate, compromise was baked into the Act at
inception.5 While necessary for passage, critical concessions rendered
enforcement of this affirmative mandate ineffectual.6 This Article’s first goal
is to account for that failure. Only through exposing the Act’s design flaws
can we unearth the enforcement gaps that abet local inertia and even fuel
opposition. ltimately, it is at the local level where progress must occur.7
Regrettably, history has proven that local compliance requires federal
pressure and unremitting accountability.8 That federal-level accountability
has not been forthcoming, largely due to the Act’s fundamental flaws.
The absence of federal accountability has allowed segregation to
flourish when it did not have to, making desegregation harder today. Four
developments converged to create the segregation we see today:
(1) decades of official government redlining i.e., the blanket denial of
federally insured mortgages to communities of color9 with private lenders
4.

The provisions collectively known as the AFFH mandate are codified at 42
.S.C. 3608. Subsection 3608(e) requires the Secretary of the .S.
Department of Housing and rban Development (H D) to administer the
department’s programs and activities in a manner affirmatively to further
fair housin policies. 42 .S.C. 3608(e)(5) (2017) (emphasis added).
Subsection 3608(d) broadly extends the obligation to a ll executive
departments and agencies. 42 .S.C. 3608(d) (2017).

5.

E. ., MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at 187 ( When a fair housing act banning
discrimination finally did pass Congress under unusual circumstances, it had
its enforcement provisions systematically gutted as its price of enactment. )
id. at 195 ( Post-enactment persistence of residential segregation followed
directly from inherent weaknesses that were built into the act as part of
Senator Dirksen’s price of passage. Although the country had its fair housing
law, it was intentionally designed so that it would not and could not work. ).

6.

d.

7.

For a discussion of how local governments have created and maintained
segregation, and their unrivaled power to deconstruct it, see ESSICA
TRO NSTINE, SEGREGATION Y DESIGN 23 38 (2018).

8.

See enerally Nikole Hannah- ones, Livin Apart How the Government
Betrayed a Landmark Civil Ri hts Law, PROP LICA ( une 25, 2015),
https: www.propublica.org article living-apart-how-the-governmentbetrayed-a-landmark -civil-rights-law https: perma.cc Y 8F-PVHZ .

9.

Gregory D. Squires
Frank Woodruff, Redlinin , in THE WILEY LAC WELL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF R AN AND REGIONAL ST DIES (Anthony Orum ed., 2019). For a
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emboldened to follow suit,10 (2) the widespread use of racially restrictive
covenants,11 (3) the advent of extreme local control as illustrated by the
proliferation of exclusionary oning,12 and (4) the creation of freeways
also using federal funds that literally sequestered lack communities and
facilitated easy suburban access for fleeing white residents.13 While these
factors were in motion before the Act’s passage, they illustrate why the
government needed to act expediently under the Act to circumvent the
entrenchment of segregation patterns.14

pop culture telling of the history of redlining with over six million views,
watch Adam Ruins Everything, he Disturbin History of the Suburbs, YO T E
(Oct. 4, 2017), https: youtu.be ETR9qrVS17g https: perma.cc ZL5FW TL .
10.

E. ., hristopher . rooks, Redlinin s Le acy Maps are Gone, But the Problem
Hasn t Disappeared, C S NEWS ( une 12, 2020), https: www.cbsnews.com
news redlining-what-is-history-mike-bloomberg-comments
https: perma.cc 57PE-5F2F .

11.

Although the Supreme Court rendered racially restrictive covenants udicially
unenforceable in Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948, 334 .S. 1, their widespread use
continued between private parties. For a history of racially restrictive
covenants in the Washington, D.C. area, see Sarah Shoenfeld
Mara
Cherkasky, he Rise and Demise of Racially Restrictive Covenants in
Bloomin dale, D.C. POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 3, 2019), https: www.dcpolicycenter.org
publications racially-restrictive-covenants-bloomingdale
https: perma.cc R3 - L34 . Several mapping initiatives document how
restrictive covenants operated across metropolitan areas, demonstrating how
covenants contributed to the demographic patterns that remain in place
today. See, e. ., MAPPING PRE DICE, https: www.mappingpre udice.org
https: perma.cc 7 NN- VZ6 (Minneapolis) Seattle C.R.
Lab. Hist.
Pro ect, Se re ated Seattle, . WASH., https: www.depts.washington.edu
civilr segregated.htm https: perma.cc 3LNZ-CG2A (Seattle).

12.

SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAIL

13.

d. at 113 15. Certainly, other factors contributed. Among them is white
resistance to integration efforts, including the use of violence, and widespread
intentional housing discrimination practices like steering, blockbusting, etc.
d. at 101 24.

14.

See, e. ., Hannah- ones, supra note 8 ( Segregation would have been cut by
half and possibly eliminated. The country would have been very different. )
(quoting Myron Orfield, niversity of Minnesota law professor and director of
the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity).
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ut the government did not act swiftly. Instead, it put its best tool the
AFFH mandate back in the toolbox as segregation patterns hardened.15
After the Act, segregation briefly decreased then plateaued.16 The most
substantial decline for most cities occurred between 1970 to 1980, followed
by only modest decline.17 The national Dissimilarity Index a uniform scale
that quantifies segregation on a scale of 0 to 100, with higher scores
reflecting higher segregation dropped from 78 in 1970 to a score of 60 in
2010.18 Overall, desegregation has been far from universal and many
metropolitan areas have experienced stalled integration at best.19 Today,
15.

See SANDER, supra note 1, at 139 41 (describing the 1970s as the critical
decade ) see also id. at 143 65 (analy ing implementation of the FHA in the
1970s).

16.

See, e. ., Massey, supra note 1, at 578 ( D eclining black-white segregation
was far from universal and . . . many metropolitan areas displayed a pattern
of stalled integration.’ ).

17.

SANDER, supra note 1, at 10, tab. 0.3 (explaining that in sixty metropolitan
areas, progress in the 1970s was noticeably greater than in subsequent
decades) id. at 139 65 (discussing the 1970s as the critical decade for
implementing the Fair Housing Act) see also Massey, supra note 1, at 578 79,
582 ( Abundant evidence suggests that racial discrimination did not end with
civil rights so much as go underground to become clandestine and less
visible. ).

18.

d. The Dissimilarity Index is a standard measure of segregation. On a scale of
0 to 1, the lowest score of 0 reflects the natural state of integration absent
discrimination and 1 reflects complete segregation. See, e. ., .S. CENS S,
Racial and Ethnic Residential Se re ation in the nited States
, at
119 (Aug. 2002), https: www.census.gov prod 2002pubs censr-3.pdf
https: perma.cc 5Y -ET8L . Put another way, the Dissimilarity Index
captures the degree to which blacks and whites are evenly spread among
neighborhoods in a city. Evenness is defined with respect to the racial
composition of the city as a whole. If a city is 10 black, then an even
residential pattern requires that every neighborhood be 10 black and 90
white. Thus, if a neighborhood is 20 black, the excess 10 of blacks must
move to a neighborhood where the black percentage is under 10 to shift the
residential configuration toward evenness. MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at
20.

19.

rian . Stults, he
Massey, supra note 1, at 578 (citing ohn R. Logan
Persistence of Se re ation in the Metropolis ew Findin s from the
Census,
S 2010 (Mar. 2011), https: s4.ad.brown.edu Pro ects
Diversity Data Report report2.pdf https: perma.cc 7P 7- 2V9 ) see
also Douglas S. Massey
acob S. Rugh, Se re ation in Post Civil Ri hts
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at least twenty-one cities remain hyper-segregated20 and the vast ma ority
of lack metropolitan residents live in high or very high segregation. 21
This Article’s second goal is to demonstrate that the Act itself must be
amended to instantiate a durable compliance process with the AFFH
mandate at the local level. Regulation alone will not do. Since Congress
passed the original Act in 1968 (the first act ),22 it has only reopened the Act
for substantive debate and amendment one time (the second act ).23 That
was over thirty years ago. While the 1988 amendments made pivotal changes
to anti-discrimination enforcement, they ignored the more visionary

America Stalled nte ration or End of the Se re ated Century , 11 D OIS REV.
2205,
05 32
(Fall
2014),
https: www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov pmc
articles PMC4782806 https: perma.cc A996-4ZE8 .
20.

Massey, supra note 1, at 579 80. For a discussion of what constitutes hypersegregation, see Tanvi Misra, America Has Half as Many Hyperse re ated
Metros as t Did in
, CITY LA (May 21, 2015), https: www.citylab.com
equity 2015 05 america-has-half-as-many-hypersegregated-metros-as-it(defining a hyperdid-in-1970 393743 https: perma.cc 6VPL-DN
segregated city as meeting four of five segregation-related criteria).

21.

SANDER et al., supra note 1 at 1 10.

22.

Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284,
82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 .S.C. 3601 3619 (2017)).

23.

Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified as amended at 42 .S.C.
3601 3619 (2017)) (amending the
original Act by adding two new protected classes disability and familial
status and strengthening discrimination enforcement provisions by
extending time to file a housing discrimination complaint from 180 days to
two years, permitting prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees and court
costs, and significantly enhancing administrative enforcement procedures)
see also RO ERT SCHWEMM, HO SING DISCRIMINATION LAW LITIGATION
5.3 5.4
(2019) (detailing amendments in historical context). To be clear, Congress has
occasionally amended the Fair Housing Act by other legislation but has not
reopened the Act to substantive debate to address the Act’s structural
deficiencies, as this Article proposes. For instance, in 1974, Congress
indirectly amended the Act in establishing the Community Development lock
Grant program. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (inserting sex as a protected class into an
assortment of federal housing laws). Congress also passed the Housing for
Older Persons Act of 1995 (HOPA), which exempts certain forms of housing
for older persons from familial status discrimination. Pub. L. No. 104-76, 109
Stat. 787 (codified as amended at 42 .S.C.
3607). None of these
amendments modified the AFFH mandate.
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integration mandate.24 Strengthening the mandate, now a half-century old,
is long overdue. The dispiriting reality is that the Act, if not amended, has
little probability of dismantling residential segregation. If amended,
however, the AFFH mandate holds unleashed potential. Its next iteration
could be our most effective anti-segregation tool yet.
Part I looks back at an early but tragically flawed attempt by H D to use
the AFFH mandate to deconstruct racial segregation. Drawing from this
history, this Section presents a legal analysis of the reasons the AFFH
mandate has been ineffective at reducing segregation. Viewed today, it may
seem little has changed in fifty years. The federal government continues to
transfer billions of dollars to local urisdictions without accountability.25
Many urisdictions spend their automatic influx of federal funds in ways
that actually reinforce segregation.26 It is here steeped in ennui that the
prospect of amending the Fair Housing Act is shrouded in frustration, even
apathy.
This Article offers a less deflated view. While the first two iterations of
the Fair Housing Act had slow and fitful starts,27 some dynamics have
changed or are on the brink. Most notable is the now-repealed Obama-era
AFFH regulation ( AFFH Rule ) promulgated by the .S. Department of
Housing and rban Development ( H D ) in 2015.28 It embodied a longawaited federal accountability framework that systemati es a local
24.

For a critique of the anti-discrimination mandate in the civil rights context,
see RO IN L. WEST, CIVIL RIGHTS: RETHIN ING THEIR NAT RAL FO NDATION (2019)
(discussing the limits and unintended consequences of a civil rights
urisprudence focused too narrowly on anti-discrimination and proposing a
broader urisprudence that draws on civil rights as founded in natural law).

25.

See, e. ., .S. DEP’T OF HO S.
R AN DEV., COMM NITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
APPROPRIATIONS
DGET,
https: www.hud.gov program offices
comm planning about budget https: perma.cc RMC2-H ZS (table of
appropriations by year).

26.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (describing through interviews local government
attitudes and the federal government’s response) ( ut other communities
with serious questions about fair housing continue to receive federal housing
dollars, and fair housing officials say H D still brushes civil rights concerns
aside. One senior housing official pointed to New Orleans, which hasn’t lost its
block grant despite the Department of ustice lawsuit. If that’s not enough to
re ect a grantees’ funding,’ he said. Any finding from the fair housing office
will not ever be sufficient.’ ).

27.

MASSEY

28.

Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 ( uly 16, 2015)
(codified at 24 C.F.R. 5.150 5.180 (2015)).

DENTON, supra note 1, at 187.
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compliance process with an eye toward outcomes, explicitly recogni ing
that success requires training local governments to first identify barriers to
integration then leveraging federal data and resources to overcome those
barriers.29
The AFFH Rule was a vital and positive step that illustrates what can
and must be done to move forward. ut any such regulation is unacceptably
vulnerable to changing political winds when the White House changes
hands. Segregation is too costly and too pervasive30 to sub ect an AFFH
regulation to the precarious one-step-forward, one-step-back rhythm of
administrative rulemaking. The statute itself must be amended.
Part II examines the Trump Administration’s assault on the AFFH
mandate. It begins with a proposed revision that would have virtually
eliminated the race-conscious elements of the AFFH Rule31 but ends in

29.

E. ., id. at 42,272 ( Through this rule, H D commits to provide states, local
governments, public housing agencies (PHAs), the communities they serve,
and the general public, to the fullest extent possible, with local and regional
data on integrated and segregated living patterns, racially or ethnically
concentrated areas of poverty, the location of certain publicly supported
housing, access to opportunity afforded by key community assets, and
disproportionate housing needs on classes protected by the Fair Housing Act.
Through the availability of such data and available local data and knowledge,
the approach provided by this rule is intended to make program participants
better able to evaluate their present environment to assess fair housing issues
such as segregation, conditions that restrict fair housing choice, and
disparities in access to housing and opportunity, identify the factors that
primarily contribute to the creation or perpetuation of fair housing issues, and
establish fair housing priorities and goals. ).

30.

See supra note 2.

31.

See, e. ., riston Capps, n Se re ated Suburbs, rump Says the uiet Part ut
Loud, LOOM ERG CITYLA ( uly 2, 2020), https: www.bloomberg.com news
articles 2017-02-03 affirmatively-furthering-fair-housing-faces-its-fate
sref FCZ3YPm https: perma.cc LRE7-Y3G ( As he’s done time and
time again, Trump said the quiet part out loud. The .S. Department of
Housing and rban Development has taken numerous steps to undermine key
rules and policies that promote desegregation as a requirement for
urisdictions that receive federal housing dollars. ut under Housing
Secretary en Carson, the agency has carefully framed those revisions in
procedural terms namely as ways to reduce the paperwork load for housing
authorities. In his tweet, Trump essentially admitted that there’s a different
motive: Eliminating the rule will reduce the pressure on local governments to
provide space and opportunity for lack families in affluent white

10
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particular tragedy. President Trump re ected H D’s initially-proposed
revisions because they did not go far enough to excise the federal
government from state decision-making. So H D went further. It skipped
the notice-and-comment process altogether and issued a new rule (the
Replacement Rule ) that repealed the Obama-era AFFH Rule entirely.32
The Replacement Rule established a rational basis test for local
planning, meaning that any conceivable pro-fair housing action will satisfy
the AFFH mandate. This process essentially rubberstamps any local
decision and allows urisdictions to continue business as usual. There are
no more federal fair housing requirements: no data analysis, no fair housing
planning documents, and no H D review. Years of progress were simply
swept away.
Despite this backsliding, a vigorously enforced AFFH mandate remains
a tool with striking potential, particularly in our current moment of
collective racial reckoning. As this Section explains, neighborhood
segregation is inextricably tied to many forms of racial in ustice. To advance
racial equity, we need a legal framework that addresses entrenched racial
segregation affirmatively by normali ing local compliance, backed by
federal resources and accountability.
Part III offers a vision for effective reform to redesign the Fair Housing
Act as an affirmative tool to meet this moment. It proposes three statutory
amendments: (1) incorporating the 2015 AFFH Rule’s substantive
components into the Act’s statutory void, (2) establishing an explicit private
right of action for AFFH enforcement, and (3) leveraging mobility programs
and source-of-income protections to reinforce the AFFH mandate’s
integration ob ective.
In today’s political climate, readers may be quick to dismiss as
impractical any proposal requiring congressional action. Anticipating these
critiques, Part III takes a hard look at these ostensibly idealistic proposals.
neighborhoods. ) Cassidy Wang, H D Proposal Could Reduce Protections
A ainst Discrimination, Housin Advocates Say, SO O RNERS (Mar. 13, 2020),
https: so o.net articles hud-proposal-could-reduce-protections-againstdiscrimination-housing-advocates-say
https: perma.cc MGR4- CVZ
(noting the proposed rule only mentions segregation two times in its 84page text while the current rule mentions it 109 times).
32.

For authority to bypass the notice-and-comment process, H D cited an APA
provision exempting matter s relating to agency management or personnel
or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. 85 Fed. Reg.
47,901, 47,904 (citing 5 .S.C. 553(a)(2)) ( ecause this rule applies only to
the AFFH obligations of grantees, it is exempt under the APA. ). This claim
appears ripe for legal challenge.
11
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It demonstrates that dual strategies are prudent and necessary not
unrealistic even in an unreceptive political climate. Fair housing
advocates must defensively protect vulnerable achievements33 while
positioning themselves to materially advance AFFH mandate enforcement
when the opportunity arises. Part III concludes with a look at several
voluntary measures that local grantees could adopt to mitigate residential
segregation in the absence of broader reform.
Opportunity may be upon us. First, seismic shifts have emerged in the
political atmosphere from a global pandemic to economic recession to
civil unrest and widespread protests in response to racist policing and the
death of George Floyd.34 Many of the inequities highlighted by protesters
are inextricably connected to residential segregation, as discussed in Part II.
These shifts point to a new line in the sand: commitment to transformative,
anti-racist policies designed to deconstruct segregation or not. Second, we
are at the dawn of a new presidential administration. President-elect oe
iden has identified closely with what his campaign called the Obamaiden Administration’s AFFH Rule. 35 Even before widespread protests in
2020, presidential candidates competed to propose policies addressing

33.

For a comprehensive list of civil and human rights rollbacks under the current
administration, see rump Administration Civil and Human Ri hts Rollbacks,
Leadership Conf. on Civ. Hum. Rts., https: civilrights.org trump-rollbacks
https: perma.cc E9M5-TRP (last accessed April 11, 2020).

34.

For opinion articles that explore potential connections between residential
segregation and current protests, see Myron Orfield Will Stancil, Opinion,
Geor e Floyd and Derek Chauvin Mi ht as Well Have Lived on Different Planets,
N.Y. TIMES ( une 3, 2020), https: www.nytimes.com 2020 06 03
opinion george-floyd-minneapolis-segregation.html
https: perma.cc S2MP-3LG7
David
rooks, Opinion, How to Do
Reparations Ri ht, N.Y. TIMES ( une 4, 2020), https: www.nytimes.com
2020 06 04 opinion united-states-reparations.html
https: perma.cc 2T D-SM3P ( The neighborhood is the unit of change. ).

35.

E. ., The iden Plan for Investing in Our Communities Through Housing,
https: oebiden.com housing https: perma.cc L 4Y-DYZ ( iden will
implement the Obama- iden Administration’s Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing Rule requiring communities receiving certain federal funding to
proactively examine housing patterns and identify and address policies that
have a discriminatory effect. ).
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racial disparities.36 Likewise, a surprising degree of bipartisan support for
housing mobility programs has emerged in Congress.37
Over thirty years later, the national stage is set for fair housing’s third
act. Further inaction threatens to prolong America’s tragic segregation saga,
but this Article’s proposed reforms could tender our most effective antisegregation legislation yet.
I.

WHERE WE’VE EEN: A LEGACY OF INACTION

History is telling. It has taken eight presidents, fourteen H D
secretaries, and nearly half a century for H D to promulgate a regulation

36.

Democratic presidential candidates have proposed various policies to address
segregation’s legacy. See, e. ., American Housing Economic Mobility Act of
2019, S. 787, 116th Cong. 201 (2019) (Sen. Eli abeth Warren) (providing
down-payment grants to first-time homebuyers living in formerly redlined or
officially segregated areas) Housing, Opportunity, Mobility, and Equity
(HOME) Act of 2018, S. 3342, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (Sen. Cory ooker)
(amending the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act to require
grant recipients to develop a strategy to support inclusive oning policies )
People First Housin ,
LI N
CASTRO 2020 ( une 17, 2019),
https: www. ulianforthefuture.com news-events people-first-housingpart-1 https: perma.cc 5WL5-W V5 ( uli n Castro, former Secretary of
H D) (proposing reforms to local oning and an affirmative implementation
of policies that further the purposes of the Fair Housing Act to address racial
disparities in local oning ).

37.

See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116 6, 133 Stat. 13,
438 (2019) (allocating with bipartisan support $28 million to a new mobility
demonstration program, including $5 million in Housing Choice Voucher
assistance). For a discussion of new research on the positive outcomes of even
moderately reduced racial and ethnic segregation, see SANDER, supra note 1, at
1 14, and the long-term intergenerational benefits of integration, see Ra
Chetty et al., he Effects of E posure to Better ei hborhoods on Children ew
Evidence from the Movin to pportunity E periment, 106 AM. EC. REV. 855
(Apr. 2016), https: scholar.harvard.edu files lkat files chk aer mto 041
6.pdf https: perma.cc ALF6-GG88 Ra Chetty Nathaniel Hendren, he
mpacts of ei hborhoods on nter enerational Mobility Childhood E posure
Effects and County Level Estimates (2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http: scholar.harvard.edu files hendren files nbhds paper.pdf
https: perma.cc V7 H-AEG .
13

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

39 : 1

2020

defining the contours of the AFFH mandate.38 Most of those years, the
federal government sidestepped any effort to carry out its AFFH duties.39
Many observers blame the government’s well-documented record of footdragging with respect to its affirmative mandate 40 for the lack of progress
in residential integration.41 ut this Article goes further, asking from a legal
perspective why the government dragged its feet for so long and how it got
away with it.
To correct a problem, one must identify its true cause. This Part looks
beyond historical inertia to scrutini e how the Act, in its current form, is illsuited to reduce segregation-in-fact. The key to effective reform is
understanding its defects. Only through examining the Act’s design flaws
historically and empirically through case study can we unearth the
enforcement gaps that must be addressed to replace inertia with a culture
of compliance among federal grant recipients.
A.

ri ins

The AFFH mandate is best understood as Congress’s acknowledgement
of the government’s role as an architect of segregation. Throughout the
twentieth century in particular, the federal government, through a welldocumented pattern of interventions, engineered and perpetuated racial

38.

Counting from 1969 to 2015, Presidents Nixon to Obama and Secretaries
George Romney to uli n Castro (or a total of eighteen H D secretaries when
counting four acting secretaries). See Dep’t of Hous.
rban Dev., H D
Secretaries, https: archives.hud.gov pastsecretaries.cfm https: perma.cc
84GL-PW4D (last visited November 1, 2020).

39.

E. ., Abdallah Fayyad, he nfulfilled Promise of Fair Housin , ATLANTIC, (Mar.
31, 2018), https: www.theatlantic.com politics archive 2018 03 thehttps: perma.cc MW8unfulfilled-promise-of-fair-housing 557009
C A (chronicling the government’s track record) Hannah- ones, supra note
8 ( Over the next four decades . . . a succession of presidents Democrats and
Republicans alike followed Nixon’s lead, declining to use the leverage of
H D’s billions to fight segregation. ).

40.

Massey, supra note 1, at 578.

41.

See, e. ., Michelle Adams, he nfulfilled Promise of the Fair Housin Act, NEW
YOR ER (Apr. 11, 2018), https: www.newyorker.com news news-desk theunfulfilled-promise-of-the-fair-housing-act https: perma.cc V5ZR-T L
Fayyad, supra note 39.
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segregation.42 Interventions ranged from redlining to mandatory
segregation of government housing to countless other policies that
subsidi ed segregation.43
In the 1960s, passage of a fair housing bill was far from inevitable.
Housing was arguably the most difficult civil rights frontier.44 In 1964,
Congress prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in voting, public
accommodations, public facilities, public education, federally assisted
programs, and employment but not housing.45 Time and again, obstinate
opponents stymied efforts to prohibit housing discrimination.46
42.

See, e. ., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2 atie Nod imbadem, he Racial Se re ation
of American Cities Was Anythin But Accidental, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 30,
2017), https: www.smithsonianmag.com history how-federalgovernment-intentionally-racially-segregated-american-cities-180963494
https: perma.cc S N5-G M ( In some cities, it’s a division based around
infrastructure, as with Detroit’s 8 Mile Road. In other cities, nature such as
Washington, D.C.’s Anacostia River is the barrier. Sometimes these divisions
are man-made, sometimes natural, but none are coincidental. ).

43.

E. ., Richard Rothstein, Public Housin Government Sponsored Se re ation,
AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 11, 2012), https: prospect.org article public-housinggovernment-sponsored-segregation
https: perma.cc 9 TD-RM92
see
also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2.

44.

See, e. ., WALTER MONDALE DAVE HAGE, THE GOOD FIGHT: A LIFE IN LI ERAL
POLITICS 55 68 (2010) (discussing the politics of getting a fair housing bill
through Congress in the 1960s).

45.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended throughout .S. Code Title 42) (2017).

46.

For a detailed history of the legislative struggle to pass fair housing legislation,
see ruce Ackerman, We the People Vol. 3: The Civil Rights Revolution, 20005 (2014) Charles M. Lamb, Housing Segregation in Suburban America Since
1960: Presidential and udicial Politics 26 35 (2005) Massey Denton, supra
note 1, at 187-94. Vice President Walter Mondale, who was the Act’s cosponsor and floor manager in the .S. Senate, later drew this distinction
between fair housing and civil rights in the public sphere of voting and public
accommodations: Fair housing came right to the neighborhoods across the
country. This was civil rights getting personal. Hannah- ones, supra note 8.
See also Sander et al., supra note 1 (describing how fair housing had the lowest
public support among white citi ens) Fifty Years of he People v. H D,
Poverty
Race
Research
Action
Council
(Feb.
2018),
https: prrac.org pdf H D50th-CivilRightsTimeline.pdf https: perma.cc
V9 4-MWA9 (documenting landmark moments in fair housing history,
including the .S. Senate’s 1949 re ection of the ricker-Cain amendment
that would have prohibited racial segregation in public housing).
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The turning point was early 1968. Three events in quick succession
opened the door. First, Everett Dirksen, a prominent senior senator from
Illinois, changed his position to supporting a watered-down measure.47
Second, a day later, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
the erner Commission released a damning report on its investigation
into the 1967 race riots and civil unrest.48 It made headlines as an
indictment of white America, assigning primary blame to segregated
neighborhoods and unequal access to economic opportunity.49 Third, on
April 4, 1968, Dr. Martin Luther ing, r. was assassinated, setting off riots
across the country.50 As smoke billowed from neighborhoods around the
Capitol, Congress finally passed its first comprehensive fair housing bill.51
47.

See, e. ., AC ERMAN, supra note 46, at 200-05 LAM , supra note 46, at 40-41
MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at 193 94. For further discussion of Senator
Dirksen’s previous position that fair housing legislation was
unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibited private conduct see
AC ERMAN, supra note 46, at 200-14, which describes the evolution of Senator
Dirksen’s stance on fair housing and compares his position to ustice Potter
Stewart’s later ma ority opinion in ones v. Mayer, 392 .S. 409 (1968).

48.

See LAM , supra note 46, at 41 MASSEY

49.

See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968)
(describing the nited States as moving toward two societies, one black, one
white separate and unequal ) see also Susan T. Gooden Samuel L. Myers,
he Kerner Commission Report Fifty Years Later, 4 R SSELL SAGE FO ND. . SOC.
SCI. 1 (2018) (describing the erner Commission Report’s findings and its
importance in .S. history) see enerally STEVEN M. GILLON, SEPARATE AND
NE AL: THE ERNER COMMISSION AND THE NRAVELING OF AMERICAN LI ERALISM
(2018) (describing the racial politics that influenced the report’s drafting and
ultimate re ection by President ohnson and the political right).

50.

See AC ERMAN, supra note 46, at 205 LAM , supra note 46, at 41 43 MASSEY
DENTON, supra note 1, at 194. Some scholars dispute the common narrative
that Dr. ing’s assassination was the principal turning point. For instance,
ruce Ackerman explains that t his is a mistake. While the shocking news
did propel a rapid House vote on April 10, all the hard work had been done
beforehand. ing’s tragic death endowed the birth of the landmark statute
with a terrible solemnity, but it should not be used to triviali e the
commitment of the American people to a constructive response to the
escalating violence. Ackerman, supra note 46, at 205 see also SANDER et al.,
supra note 1, at 135 (noting that a widespread legend about the Fair
Housing Act is that Congress passed it in response to ing’s assassination
when i n reality, by far the hardest challenge facing the bill was to get it
through the Senate, and that happened several weeks before ing’s death ).
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In it, Congress set forth two distinct but complementary mandates: (1)
an anti-discrimination mandate, requiring equal treatment on the basis of
race, color, national origin, and religion (and later sex, familial status, and
disability) and (2) an affirmative mandate that requires the federal
government to use its resources to deconstruct segregated housing
patterns.52 The latter the AFFH mandate boldly memoriali es
Congress’s directive that the government use its resources to reduce
segregation by declaring that all executive departments and agencies shall
administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban
development . . . in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of fair
housin . 53 It is this tongue-twister that earned it the nickname the AFFH
mandate.
To date, the AFFH mandate has received considerably less attention in
academic literature, legislation, or policy advocacy than its sibling nondiscrimination mandate.54 Nonetheless, there is little question that
Congress intended to do more than simply prohibit discrimination.55

51.

Title VIII through I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 are commonly known as
the Fair Housing Act. Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (enacted April 11, 1968)
(codified as amended at 42 .S.C.
3601 3631). For a detailed history and
maps of the April 1968 riots in Washington D.C., see he Four Days in
that
Reshaped
D.C.,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
27,
2018),
https: www.washingtonpost.com graphics 2018 local dc-riots-1968
https: perma.cc NC3-ZHEC .

52.

he
Raphael ostic Arthur Acolin, Affirmatively Furtherin Fair Housin
Mandate to End Se re ation, in THE FIGHT FOR FAIR HO SING 190-91 (Gregory D.
Squires ed., 2018) (describing the dual mandates). The legislative record
contains multiple examples of sponsor statements on the purpose of the
integration mandate. E. ., 114 CONG. REC. 2527-28 (1968) (statement of Sen.
rooke) ( R arely does H D withhold funds or defer action in the name of
desegregation. In fact, if it were not for all the printed guidelines the housing
agencies have issued since 1964, one would scarcely know a Civil Rights Act
had been passed. ) 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)
(describing one of the Act’s purposes as replacing ghettos with truly
integrated and balanced living patterns ).

53.

42 .S.C. 3608(d) (emphasis added).

54.

See ostic Acolin, supra note 52, at 191 ( From an institutional perspective,
the mandate to affirmatively further fair housing has been far less invested
in. ).

55.

See Robert G. Schwemm, vercomin Structural Barriers to nte rated
Housin
A Back to the Future Reflection on the Fair Housin Act s
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Federal courts weighed in, interpreting the AFFH mandate to require
the government to take affirmative steps to reduce segregation.56 Every
court that has considered the question has held that Title VIII imposes
upon H D an obligation to do more than simply refrain from discrimination
(and from purposely aiding discrimination by others). 57 The AFFH
mandate reflects Congress’s desire to have H D use its grant programs
to assist in ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the
supply of genuinely open housing increases. 58 y the 1980s, a critical mass
of courts had opined that the AFFH mandate requires affirmative
government action to deconstruct residential segregation period. Hard
stop.59

Affirmatively Further Mandate, 100
AFFH mandate’s legislative history).

Y. L.

. 125, 126 30 (2012) (detailing the

56.

See Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1124 (2d Cir. 1973) Shannon
rban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1970).
v. .S. Dep’t of Hous.

57.

NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous.
rban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) (thenFirst Circuit udge Stephen reyer). For further discussion of early appellate
urisprudence, see Robert G. Schwemm, supra note 55, at 137-44 Timothy M.
Smyth, Michael Allen Marisa Schnaith, he Fair Housin Act he Evolvin
Re ulatory Landscape for Federal Grant Recipients and Sub Recipients, 23 .
AFFORDA LE HO SING COMM. DEV. LAW 231, 233 35 (2015).

58.
59.
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AACP, 817 F.2d at 155.
Schwemm, supra note 55, at 144 ( With the First Circuit’s decision in the
AACP case , lower-court interpretations of 3608 had established the
following propositions: (1) H D’s duties and by extension those of its
grantees included not merely the avoidance of discriminatory action, but
the requirement to take affirmative steps to achieve racial integration in the
particular housing markets funded (2) private enforcement of this mandate
could not be done through the FHA’s normal enforcement mechanisms nor
based on a private right of action under 3608, but only through an APAbased claim and (3) because of (2), courts could only set aside H D actions
that were determined to be an arbitrary or capricious’ violation of 3608,
and such APA-based claims could only result in in unctive relief and not also
damages or attorney’s fees. ).
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B. More than a Missed pportunity
Told by some, meaningful attempts to enforce the AFFH mandate
began and ended with the Nixon Administration.60 Most notorious is the
showdown between President Nixon and his first Secretary of the
Department of Housing and rban Development, George Romney.
Recogni ing the mandate’s potential, Romney resolved to leverage it to
withhold federal funding from uncooperative cities.61 Romney’s
commitment to what was commonly called open housing was informed by
his exposure as the governor of Michigan to extreme racial segregation,
suburban white flight, and race riots.62
Fearful that Nixon would rebuff his efforts, Romney largely operated in
secret.63 He saw federal funding as critical leverage for changing the
decision-making calculus of segregated cities.64 He knew they were
dependent on federal resources particularly for pricey public works like
freeways and sewers.65 In pursuit of fair housing, Romney used the
newborn AFFH to threaten and ultimately to terminate federal grants if the
local urisdictions stubbornly refused to build low-income housing in
defiant white neighborhoods.66

60.

See, e. ., AC
(2005).

61.

See LAM , supra note 46, at 84-94 see also id. at 57 ( Romney may have
actually pressed harder to achieve suburban housing integration than any
other prominent federal official of the 1970s, the 1980s, or the 1990s. ).

62.

See id. at 56 57, 85, 104 Hannah- ones, supra note 8.

63.

E. . LAM , supra note 46, at 69 73.

64.
65.

66.

ERMAN, supra

note 46, at 218 23 LAM , supra note 46, at 56 107

d.
Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (quoting Myron Orfield, niversity of Minnesota
law professor and director of the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity,
Romney recogni ed these places got a lot of stuff from the federal
government. And Romney said if the federal government is going to build you
a new freeway and sewer systems the government was footing about 80
percent of the cost you are not going to build communities at the end of
those freeway and sewer systems for only affluent white people. ).
d. at 84 94 Hannah- ones, supra note 8.
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Eventually, President Nixon received complaints from southern and
suburban leaders, two key voting constituencies.67 He reacted swiftly,
shutting Romney out of his inner circle.68 y 1970, Romney was forced to
abandon his initiative and resigned at the end of Nixon’s first term.69
Romney proved that the AFFH mandate has or could have teeth, if the
federal government put its weight behind it. ut his approach was re ected
by a president who feared being seen as an integrator on Election Day.70
With Romney out, Nixon went rogue. He announced that he, not H D,
would set national fair housing policy.71 He instructed his counsel’s office to
research how narrowly he could construe the AFFH mandate.72 Nixon’s
counsel set out to craft an interpretation that only required the federal
government to intervene to address overt acts of discrimination.73 ut,
tellingly, when legal counsel reviewed the case law, it concluded that
Nixon’s preferred approach contravened the Act.74 Federal courts had

67.

E. . LAM , supra note 46, at 91 (southern leaders) id. at 95 (suburban vote)
see also CHRISTOPHER ONASTIA, NOC ING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE S
R S 101 (2006) (emphasi ing
that Nixon risked alienating white suburban supporters already angry about
school busing initiatives ).

68.

Massey, supra note 1, at 577 (quoting Nixon’s statement to his chief of staff:
ust keep Romney away from me ) LAM , supra note 46, at 130 35
(describing Ehrlichman’s memo to Nixon that referred to suburban
integration as a serious Romney problem which we will apparently have as
long as he is there and Nixon’s scrawled note on the memo’s margin: Stop
this one ).

69.

LAM , supra note 46, at 129, 130, 135.

70.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8.

71.

LAM , supra note 46, at 57, 107, 157-64 (telling the story of how Nixon
centrali ed fair housing decision-making).

72.

Massey, supra note 1, at 577 ( T his country is not ready at this time for either
forcibly integrated housing or forcibly integrated education. ).

73.

LAM , supra note 46, at 107, 161 62 (collecting a timeline of Nixon’s fair
housing activity) id. at 163 64 ( In an abstract sense, Nixon seemed to agree
with the most basic principles laid down by the Fair Housing Act. In reality,
his interpretation of the act was literal and cramped, making aggressive
enforcement impossible. ) Hannah- ones, supra note 8 ( Nixon decided that
he, not H D, would set the nation’s policy on fair housing. ).

74.

See Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (describing special counsel Leonard
Garment’s attempt to craft a strategy consistent with both the courts’
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already interpreted the AFFH mandate as an affirmative and ongoing
obligation to redress segregation.75
Displeased, Nixon’s domestic adviser, ohn Ehrlichman, went shopping
for a second opinion.76 He found a lawyer in the president’s executive office
who opined that the government could restrict enforcement to cases of
individual discrimination and thereby side-step problematic systemic
issues like exclusionary oning that had the effect of perpetuating racial
exclusion.77 Even so, the executive office opinion too warned that while that
its interpretation would avoid any hint of forced integration’ . . . it may
not fulfill the Government’s obligation under the law. 78 Relying on the
executive office opinion and ignoring its caution Nixon ordered H D to
stop all efforts to pressure local urisdictions to integrate housing.79
Nixon’s recalcitrance set the tone for decades. He countenanced federal
abdication of its affirmative duty to deconstruct the segregation it built. 80

interpretations of the law and Nixon’s political needs, which he ultimately
concluded was not possible).
75.

d. see also supra notes 56 59 (citing early case law).

76.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8. For closer look at Romney’s initiatives and his
tense relationship with the Nixon White House, see EEANGA-YAMAHTTA
TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW AN S AND THE REAL ESTATE IND STRY NDERMINED
LAC HOMEOWNERSHIP 93 131 (2019).

77.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (detailing Ehrlichman’s solicitation of attorney
Tom Stoel in the President’s executive office, who argued the government
could restrict enforcement of the law to cases of individual discrimination’
and need not get involved in oning issues or press communities to build
affordable housing, as it would avoid any hint of forced integration’ but
may not fulfill the Government’s obligation under the law.’ ) see also LAM ,
supra note 46, at 146 47 (describing how Nixon’s une 1971 fair housing
policy statement narrowly construed the AFFH mandate).

78.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8 see ONASTIA, supra note 67, at 101, 190 n.30
(citing a memorandum from Tom Stoel to Leonard Garment).

79.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8 ( With that, the federal government’s only largescale effort to integrate the segregated suburbs it helped create sputtered to
a close. The Fair Housing Act was ust four years old. ) LAM , supra note 46,
at 107, 157 64.

80.

E. . LAM , supra note 46, at 165 ( The politics of suburban segregation did not
end after Richard Nixon left the White House on August 9, 1974. Instead,
Nixon’s influence in fair housing persists into the twenty-first
century . . . Nixon’s basic suburban housing policy has survived five
subsequent presidents and remains the policy of H D. ).
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For nearly half a century, the one-word history of the AFFH mandate has
been inaction. ut this legacy is more than a missed opportunity. As
discussed in Part II, the steep cost we’re paying for that inaction is today’s
entrenched segregation.
C. Absent Compliance orm
The AFFH mandate’s failures are not entirely attributable to inaction.
The statute’s original flaws are also behind that legacy.81 Foremost is the
mandate’s implied enforcement mechanism the exclusively H Dcontrolled spigot of federal funding. A unifying theme across five decades is
that H D has rarely threatened to withhold funding, let alone carried out
such a threat.82 Consequently, local urisdictions perceive federal funding as
an automatic influx of resources, free from accountability.83 Had the
original statute spelled out the AFFH mandate in more detail, H D may have
been less reticent to terminate funding. Even so, the AFFH mandate suffers
from other flaws, notably its exclusive reliance on H D as AFFH enforcer.

81.

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 addressed enforcement of the
anti-discrimination mandate but did not alter the AFFH integration mandate.
See supra notes 23-24.

82.

See, e. ., Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (noting the author’s investigation
revealed only two occasions since Romney’s tenure in which H D withheld
money from communities for violating the Fair Housing Act. In several
instances . . . H D has sent grants to communities even after they’ve been
found by courts to have prompted segregated housing or been sued by the .S.
Department of ustice ) see also Affirmatively Furtherin Fair Housin at H D
A First erm Report Card, POVERTY RACE RESEARCH ACTION CO NCIL 3 5 (Mar.
2013),
https: prrac.org pdf H DFirstTermReportCardPartII.pdf
https: perma.cc 7APN-MPAH (describing two instances in which H D
threatened to withhold funds) Nikole Hannah- ones, Westchester County
Could Lose Millions for Fair Housin Failures, PROP LICA (Mar. 28, 2013),
https: www.propublica.org article westchester-county-could-losemillions-for-fair-housing-failures
https: perma.cc T 9 -WZP
( The
actual stripping of funds they have been fro en for years would be an
unprecedented move for an agency long critici ed for its failures to enforce
federal housing law. ).

83.

Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (describing how one Wisconsin community
continues to receive its automatic influx of H D dollars despite a H D
investigation into allegations that it allowed certain communities to block
rental housing in certain all-white neighborhoods to exclude lack and
Hispanic renters).
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This Section examines the mandate’s frail enforcement features. It traces
the mandate’s evolution, ultimately arriving at the 2015 AFFH Rule.
Three principal problems emerge from this chronology: First, there is
not and never has been a culture of compliance among local
urisdictions.84 Even after fifty years, there is no basic norm among grantees
that they are required to routinely identify, evaluate, and use its resources
to overcome barriers to fair housing.85 Second, the statutory text lacks both
meaningful definitions and an accountability framework. Virtually all
substantive content has been promulgated by rulemaking. While
administrative regulations are a starting place, they are vulnerable to
revision under thin pretext, as illustrated in the case study. Third, there is

84.

This Article uses interchangeably the terms local urisdictions, grantees,
and federal funding recipients, to refer to the approximately 1,200
urisdictions that receive federal funds from H D in the form of grants, such
as the Community Development lock Grants (CD Gs). See Community
R . DEV.,
Development Block Grant Pro ram, .S. DEP’T OF HO S.
https: web.archive.org web 20200114212417 https: www.hud.gov pro
gram offices comm planning communitydevelopment programs
(identifying 1,209 units of local government that receive CD G funds,
including states, counties, cities, and smaller units of local government).

85.

arriers, in this context, are elements that restrict access to opportunity based
on protected characteristics. See, e. ., 24 C.F.R. 5.152 (2020) (defining
Affirmatively furthering fair housing ). Common examples cited by H D
include burdensome governmental processes, the concentration of
substandard housing stock in specific areas, or restrictions based on the
source of a tenant’s income (e.g. landlords who refuse to rent to tenants who
pay rent with government assistance). Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,
85 Fed. Reg. 2041, 2043 ( an. 14, 2020). One of the most common culprits is
exclusionary oning. Restrictive oning ordinances whether they limit
density, set minimum lot si es or otherwise operate as a barrier to entry for
certain races even if they are race-neutral because, among other reasons, race
is correlated with income level, which is often correlated with type of housing
that is oning-restricted. One researcher describes the correlation as follows:
A ma or cause of racial segregation is already known: oning regulation.
Zoning regulation segregates by race because race is frequently correlated
with income. Zoning segregates by income through density limits, minimum
lot si es, and by reducing the supply of housing in cities, thereby creating
regional housing affordability issues that push low-income racial minorities
out. Vanessa rown Calder, What Secretary Carson Should Know about
Affirmatively Furtherin Fair Housin , CATO INST. (May 10, 2018),
https: www.cato.org blog what-secretary-carson-should-know-aboutaffirmatively-furthering-fair-housing-affh https: perma.cc 86 A- EPV .
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no express private right of action to enforce local AFFH compliance. Thus,
when H D looks away, no one else has power to compel local action.
This Section emphasi es the critical need for the federal government to
cultivate a new norm among local grantees a routini ed process that
requires local planners to assess and address that community’s
impediments to fair housing. This Article begins at the natural starting point
for fostering such a norm process, not immediate or measurable
outcomes. While outcomes are the desired result, process is the first step in
norm-setting, which is necessary for sustained, measurable outcomes.
A norm requires some form of deterrence, meaning it requires (1) clear
expectations (2) backed by material consequences. To date, the AFFH
mandate has only been enforced by perfunctory attempts at nominal
compliance, without meaningful follow-through. In an average year, H D
transfers millions of dollars to local urisdictions in the form of community
development funds.86 Despite widespread noncompliance, H D rarely
exercises its principal leverage federal funding.87 Today, there exists

86.

See H D Awards and Allocations, .S. DEP’T OF HO S.
R AN DEV.,
https: www.hudexchange.info grantees allocations-awards
https: perma.cc 7 8 -7 HD (last visited Oct. 18, 2020). In fiscal year
2019, H D distributions included CD G grants ($3.3 billion), HOME
Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) grants ($1.3 billion), Emergency
Shelter Grants ($280 million), and Housing Opportunities for Persons with
AIDS (HOPWA) grants ($378 million). d. A Government Accountability Office
report breakdown illustrates H D’s similar program distributions in fiscal
year 2009: CD G grants ($3.6 billion), HOME Investment Partnerships
Program (HOME) grants ($1.8 billion), Emergency Shelter Grants ($1.7
billion), and Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) grants
($310 million), among others. See GAO REPORT, infra note 103 at 4 5. In both
2009 and 2019, these grants amounted to over $5 billion dollars in free money
to local urisdictions, exclusive of even more si able federal transportation
grants. For additional discussion of the relevance of transportation grants, see
infra note 215.

87.

See supra notes 61 63 see also ostic Acolin, supra note 52 (discussing the
mandate’s carrots and sticks). For an extensive discussion of the benefits of
using funding cut-offs to promote state and local change among noncompliant
grantees, see Eloise Pasachoff, A ency Enforcement of Spendin Clause
Statutes A Defense of the Fundin Cut ff, 124 YALE L. . 248 (2014).
Institutional factors that may explain H D’s reluctance to withhold funds
include (1) the complicated relationship between the Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity office and other program offices (FHEO tends to lack internal
clout) (2) concern that more local urisdictions will decline federal funding,
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virtually no deterrent for non-compliance. This Section accounts for that
failure.
1. Analysis of Impediments (AI)
ntil 2015, the government’s attempts to enforce the AFFH mandate
were nominal at best. In 1974, with the advent of Community Development
lock Grants that transferred funds from federal to local coffers, H D began
requiring grantees to certify they would affirmatively further fair housing
as a condition of funding.88 ut what it meant to affirmatively further fair
housing or the consequences for failure to do so remained unclear. For
decades, there were no notable H D reprimands. It was not until twenty
years later that President Clinton issued an executive order regarding
grantee obligations.89 It contained minimal new guidance but did direct the
H D secretary to promulgate regulations defining grantee obligations.90
In 1995, H D issued basic regulations, consolidating duties into a new
mandatory process called an Analysis of Impediments of fair housing or
AI. 91 The regulations defined a fund recipient’s AFFH duty as affirmatively
certifying it had performed three discrete obligations: (1) conduct an
analysis to identify impediments to fair housing choice within the
urisdiction, (2) take appropriate actions to overcome the effects of any
impediments identified through that analysis, and (3) maintain records
reflecting the analysis and actions taken pursuant to the first two

which would decrease H D’s influence and (3) the disconnect between local
officials whose actions violate fair housing laws (often legislative or oning
bodies) and the local bureaucrats that administer H D grants.
88.

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 authori ed the use of
Community Development lock Grant (CD G) funds for public services and
for planning and program administration costs. Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633,
641 42 (codified as amended in 42 .S.C.) Consolidated Submission for
Community Planning and Development Programs, 60 Fed. Reg. 1878, 1919
( an. 5, 1995) 24 C.F.R. 570.601(a)(2) (2015) (AFFH as applied to CD G)
24 C.F.R. 91.225(a)(1) (2015) (local urisdiction AFFH certifications for
Consolidated Plans regarding housing activities under CD G, HOME, ESG, and
HOPWA funds).

89.

Exec. Order No. 12892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939, 2940 41 ( an. 20, 1994).

90.
91.

d.
60 Fed. Reg. 1878, 1919 ( an. 5, 1995) 24 C.F.R. 91.225(a)(1) (1995).
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obligations.92 Notably, H D did not require grantees to submit their AIs to
the agency an omission that rendered the process toothless.93
2. Watershed Litigation
With the dawn of AIs, advocates achieved new success in the courtroom,
particularly using the False Claims Act and administrative complaints.
While they achieved landmark settlements and favorable case law, the
shortcomings of these litigation vehicles soon emerged.
Two cases are emblematic of the watershed litigation. First, in nited
States e rel. Anti Discrimination Center v. Westchester County (2006), the
Anti-Discrimination Center (ADC) alleged Westchester County, NY had
received $52 million in federal funds under false pretenses in violation of
the False Claims Act (FCA).94 Specifically, it asserted Westchester (1) failed
to conduct an analysis of fair housing impediments that considered race,
(2) failed to identify and take steps to overcome impediments, and (3) failed
to meet its obligation to maintain records.95
The district court granted partial summary udgment in favor of the
plaintiff, holding that Westchester had falsely certified seven annual AFFH
certifications and more than one thousand implied certifications of
92.

24 C.F.R.
91.225(a)(1) 91.325(a)(1) 570.487(b), 570.601(a)(2) (2015)
see also 24 C.F.R. 903.7(o) (2015) (requiring Public Housing Authorities to
incorporate AFFH obligations in their PHA Administrative Plans).

93.

The following year, H D issued a Fair Housing Planning Guide to assist
R AN DEV., FAIR
urisdictions with completing AIs. .S. DEP’T OF HO S.
HO SING
PLANNING
G IDE
1-3
(1996),
https: www.hud.gov
sites documents FHPG.pdf https: perma.cc
6 - DM . The Guide
restated AFFH’s broad application: Although the grantee’s AFFH obligation
arises in connection with the receipt of federal funding, its AFFH obligation is
not restricted to the design and operation of H D-funded programs at the
state or local level. The AFFH obligation extends to all housing and housingrelated activities in the grantee’s urisdictional area whether publicly or
privately funded. d. at 1-3. The Guide also offered some guidance on how to
analy e and eliminate the presence of housing discrimination in the
urisdiction and provide more inclusive housing options for historically
disfavored groups. d. at 2-16 to 2-30. Nevertheless, it still did not require
grantees to submit any documentation to H D for review.

94.

.S. e rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cty., N.Y.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing to complaint).

95.

.S. e . rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty. (S.D.N.Y. 2009), (1:06cv-2860), ECF No. 11, at 14 15 668 F. Supp. 2d at 548 59, 561 62.
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compliance regarding H D funds.96 Notably, the court stressed that the
AFFH certification process was not a mere formality but a substantive
obligation that required Westchester to conduct an analysis of fair housing
that considered race (as opposed to simply poverty), take appropriate
actions in response to its analysis, and document its analysis and actions. 97
Shortly thereafter, the parties entered a $62.5 million settlement
agreement.98
Meanwhile, plaintiffs pushed for more vigorous H D enforcement.
sing the administrative complaint process, individuals and organi ations
challenged how state and local urisdictions distributed CD G funds.99 For
illustration, in e as Low ncome Housin nformation Service et al. v. e as
et al. (2009), private fair housing groups challenged Texas’s distribution
plan for nearly $1.7 billion of Hurricane atrina-related grants.100 They
96.

668 F. Supp. 2d at 550 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). As a qui tam action under the False
Claims Act, the federal government had the opportunity to intervene. The .S.
Department of ustice initially declined to intervene and the complaint was
unsealed and served in anuary 2007. Later, under the Obama Administration,
the Department of ustice reconsidered and intervened for purposes of
assisting the parties in negotiating a settlement. Case Profiles Anti
Discrimination Center v. Westchester County, RELMAN DANE
COLFA ,
https: www.relmanlaw.com cases-westchester
https: perma.cc 634P5LGD .

97.

668 F. Supp. 2d at 569 ( The AFFH certification was not a mere boilerplate
formality, but rather was a substantive requirement, rooted in the history and
purpose of the fair housing laws and regulations, requiring the County to
conduct an AI, take appropriate actions in response, and to document its
analysis and actions. ).

98.

See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 4 6, .S. e . rel. AntiDiscrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty., No. 1:06-cv-2860 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), ECF
No. 320 Case Profiles, supra note 98 see also Nikole Hannah- ones,
Westchester County Could Lose Millions for Fair Housin Failures, PROP LICA
(Mar. 28, 2013), https: www.propublica.org article westchester-countycould-lose-millions-for-fair-housing-failures
https: perma.cc Z2W SH .

99.

Schwemm, supra note 55, at 166 ( With respect to administrative complaints,
fourteen privately initiated 3608-based claims were pending as of April
2011. ).

100. See Conciliation Agreement, Tex. Low Income Hous. Info. Serv. et al. v. Texas
et al., H D No. 06-10-0410-8 (May 25, 2010), https: www.hud.gov sites
documents DOC 4305.PDF https: perma.cc PVH9-793
see also Press
Release, H D Applauds Revised $1.7 illion Texas Disaster Plan (May 25,
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alleged, among other things, that Texas had failed to analy e the fair housing
impact of its allocation plan, particularly to certain localities with a history
of integration resistance, and asserted the plan would affirmatively
perpetuate segregation, not integration.101 The case resulted in a significant
settlement, requiring Texas to shore up its AFFH obligations, including
updating its AI, document how municipalities (receiving funds from Texas
as subgrantees) were satisfying their AFFH obligations, and spend over
$252 million on affordable and subsidi ed housing in targeted
communities.102
This growing body of litigation produced two noteworthy results. First,
plaintiffs obtained substantial settlements against local governments,
arguably the first semblance of teeth behind the mandate since Romney’s
efforts. Second, it spurred H D to step up enforcement. In 2010, H D
internally reviewed more than 300 AIs for compliance.103 While that reflects
a fraction of all grantees, it was more than H D had ever done to review
AIs.104 Nevertheless, success has been tempered by the limitations of the
FCA and administrative complaints as broader AFFH enforcement
vehicles.105
2010),
https: archives.hud.gov news 2010 pr10-106.cfm
https: perma.cc 42EY-LP W (describing the conciliation agreement, as
approved by H D).
101. See id. see also Schwemm, supra note 55, at 167 nn.254 55 (describing the
settlement and related fair housing settlements).
102. See Conciliation Agreement, supra note 100 see also Schwemm, supra note 55,
at 167 nn.254 55.
103.

.S. GOV’T ACCO NTA ILITY OFF., GAO-10-905, HO SING AND COMM NITY GRANTS:
H D NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS RE IREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF RISDICTIONS’ FAIR
HO SING PLANS 46 47 (Sept. 2010)
hereinafter GAO Report ,
https: www.gao.gov assets 320 311065.pdf
https: perma.cc R 5LRLLT .

104. See id. at 45 47 (appended letter from H D Assistant Secretary discussing the
breadth of H D’s review efforts).
105. In the case of the False Claims Act, if other courts agree with the district court
in Westchester, FCA claims will only survive a motion to dismiss where the
plaintiff can plausibly allege that the urisdiction falsely certified that it
undertook an analysis of race (as opposed to only poverty). This holding
appears to be limited to failing to conduct any analysis of race which
Westchester did not because it substituted income for race and does not
speak to a merely substandard analysis. In other words, substantial
compliance with the minimal AI framework may defeat an FCA challenge.
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3. Renewed Scrutiny
It quickly became clear that the AI process was ineffective. etween
2008 and 2010, three prominent investigations drove the point home:
While AIs were a modest improvement over so-called certification the
process from 1974 to 1995 the new schema still lacked meaningful federal
accountability. This point was illustrated by the fact that grantees were not
even required to submit their AIs to H D for review. Even when H D later
investigated a record number of AIs (one-fourth of all grantees), it didn’t
hold anyone’s feet to the fire for submitting insufficient AIs.106
In 2008, the Fair Housing Act’s fortieth anniversary, civil rights leaders
convened the National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
to study fair housing’s future.107 Two former H D secretaries co-chaired the
Presumably, after Westchester, most urisdictions easily avoid FCA liability by
conducting at least a nominal analysis of fair housing by race. For a broader
discussion of the limits of the FCA, see Stephen F. Hayes, Enforcin Civil Ri hts
bli ations hrou h the False Claims Act, 1 COL M. . RACE L. 29 (2011).
Perhaps the foremost barrier to effective FCA litigation is the public disclosure
bar. See 31 .S.C. 3730(E)(4)(A) (precluding suit when there has been a
public disclosure of the allegations or transactions at issue, unless the relator
is an original source of the information ) .S. e rel. Lockey v. City of Dallas,
576 F. App’x 431, 434 38 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Finally, it bears noting that FCA claims are not the only potential avenue for
private action. Two other options may be available, but neither is promising.
First is an APA challenge, which is sub ect to the strict limits discussed above.
See supra note 59. Second is a Section 1983 action. While courts have not
universally excluded this option, case law strongly suggests courts disfavor
the approach. Schwemm, supra note 55, at 144 n.115 (citing cases).
Administrative complaints have their own limitations, including that they
depend on H D action, proceed slowly, and are limited in scope and
precedential value.
106. See Peter Applebome, nte ration Faces a ew est in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2009) https: www.nytimes.com 2009 08 23 weekinreview
23applebome.html https: perma.cc R7V5-9T F (quoting H D Deputy
Secretary Ron Sims regarding the Westchester settlement, ntil now, we’ve
tended to lay dormant. This is historic because we are going to hold people’s
feet to the fire. ).
107.

he Future of Fair Housin , Nat’l Comm’n on Fair Housing Equal Opportunity
2
hereinafter
National
Commission
Report
(Dec.
2008),
https: www.nationalfairhousing.org wp-content uploads 2017 04
Future of Fair Housing.pdf https: perma.cc
2T-L24H .
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Commission Henry Cisneros (Clinton Administration) and ack emp
(G.W. ush Administration).108 The National Commission held hearings in
five cities, taking extensive testimony.109
The National Commission did not hold back in its final report. On the
AFFH mandate, it candidly concluded:
T he government and its grantees have not taken this mandate
seriously. In order to make this statutory obligation a reality, we
must make changes in federal programs and activities to avoid
further segregation and promote wider housing choices for
families . . . . D espite the strong statutory underpinning for the
AFFH obligation, the testimony unanimously reported that the
process was not functioning as intended. H D has not been
successful in bringing the affirmatively furthering obligation to
life.110
On H D’s fumbling:
H D only requires that communities that receive federal funds certify
to their funding agency that a urisdiction is affirmatively furthering fair
housing. H D requires no evidence that anything is actually bein done
as a condition of fundin , and it does not take adverse action if
urisdictions are directly involved in discriminatory actions or fail to
affirmatively further fair housing.111
The National Commission issued specific recommendations to H D:
(1) promulgate detailed AFFH requirements, such as benchmarks,
performance standards, and sanctions for non-compliance (2) provide
grantees more training and technical assistance in the AI process and
(3) aggressively monitor AIs for compliance. Particularly noteworthy is its
final recommendation: (4) make non-compliance directly actionable
through administrative complaints filed by individuals and
organi ations. 112

108. d. (Executive Summary).
109. d. at 1.
110. d. (Executive Summary).
111. d. (emphasis added).
112. d. at 44 46.
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Soon, H D conducted its own internal investigation.113 And a third
entity followed suit at the request of Congress, the .S. Government
Accountability Office launched an investigation.114 While the National
Commission examined fair housing compliance more broadly, H D and the
GAO narrowed their focus to AFFH compliance.115
H D examined whether AIs met even basic guidelines.116 H D
randomly reviewed a sample of seventy AIs from urisdictions across the
country.117 Among them, only forty-five turned AIs over to H D.118 In other
words, over one-third of grantees either did not have or could not locate an
AI. Perhaps this shouldn’t be surprising: While AIs had been required for
over a decade, this was probably the first time H D had ever asked those
urisdictions to prove they had actually conducted an analysis. It is highly
likely some never did. In its final report, H D issued the following internal
recommendations: at a minimum, require grantees to submit their AIs to
etter yet, for transparency and
H D to prove completion.119
accountability, H D should review every submission for compliance and
post AIs in a publicly available clearinghouse.120
113.

.S. DEP’T OF HO S.
R AN DEV., POLICY DEV. DIVISION, OFF. OF POLICY DEV.
RESEARCH, ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS ST DY hereinafter H D ST DY (2009),
https: assets.documentcloud.org documents 365748 hud-reportingcompliance-report.pdf https: perma.cc 6 E - C4 see also GAO REPORT,
supra note 103, at 2, 4, 22, 25 (citing the internal H D study). Around the same
time, advocacy groups released reports detailing similar AFFH enforcement
deficiencies and parallel reform recommendations. See, e. ., The Opportunity
Agenda, Reformin H D s Re ulations to Affirmatively Further Fair Housin
(Mar. 2010), https: www.opportunityagenda.org sites default files 201703 2010.03ReformingH DRegulations.pdf https: perma.cc H 8N-H F .

114. GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 36 37.
115. Compare NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, with GAO REPORT, supra
note 103, and H D ST DY, supra note 113.
116. GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 2 n.5 (explaining the scope of the internal H D
ST DY, including timeliness of AI submissions and types of impediments to fair
housing analy ed by local communities).
117. H D ST

DY, supra note 113, at 4.

118. d. GAO REPORT, supra note 103 at 12 see also id. at 14 n.19 (observing that
some urisdictions may have been receiving funding without preparing an AI
and observing H D field office officials had identified at least one grantee that
had received funds without preparing an AI).
119. H D ST

DY, supra note 113, at 16

18.

120. d. at 17.
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The GAO report was especially unflattering. oldly titled Housing and
Community Grants: H D Needs to Enhance Its Requirements and Oversight
of urisdictions’ Fair Housing Plans, the report reviewed AIs from a
randomly selected sample of 466 of the 1,209 fiscal year grantees.121 It
found fewer than two-thirds had current AIs at least 29 percent were
outdated.122
ltimately, the GAO found that AIs failed to serve their intended
purpose to help grantees identify and overcome specific impediments to
fair housing.123 It attributed at least part of the problem to H D’s lack of
enforcement.124 The GAO recommended H D enact uniform standards (e. .
format and timeframes) and that grantees be required to submit AIs to H D
for review.125
121. GAO REPORT, supra note 103 (unnumbered title page), at 3.
122. d. at 9 11. The GAO also observed that two H D offices share responsibility
for overseeing CD G and HOME grantee compliance with AFFH requirements:
The Office of Community Planning and Development and Office of Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity, which may complicate effective oversight. d.
at 8 9. Like H D, the GAO also struggled to obtain AIs from many
urisdictions, which strongly suggested those urisdictions never conducted
them. d. at 3 4, 9 ( GAO did not receive AIs from 25 grantees despite
repeated requests that they provide them, which suggests that, in some cases,
grantees may not maintain the documents as is required. ). Perhaps most
importantly, the GAO report found that many AIs contained grossly
inadequate analyses. For instance, some urisdiction attempted to pass off the
following documents as AIs: a two-page email noting a single impediment in
another case, a four-page survey of residents on fair housing, without analysis
of the results and in a third case, a three-page document describing activities
to reduce homelessness that described affordable housing barriers without
discussing race-related barriers. d. at 14 15.
123. d. at 2, 21, 31 32.
124. d. at 22.
125. d. at 32 33 see also Ed Gramlich, Affirmatively Furtherin Fair Housin
AFFH nder the July ,
Final Rule
Advocates Guide, NAT’L LOW
INCOME HO S. COAL. 7-27 to 7-28, https: nlihc.org sites default files AG2019 Advocates-Guide 2019.pdf https: perma.cc PNE8- 9SW ( The AI
framework was not effective . . . . There were numerous limitations of the
pre-existing AFFH system, beginning with the absence of regulatory
guidance . . . . Without guidance and because public participation was not
required in the preparation of an AI, many wholly inadequate AIs were
drafted. Although other AIs were quite extensive, they seemed destined to sit
on a shelf in case H D asked to see them (AIs were not submitted to H D for
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4. AFFH Rule (2015)
Galvani ed by these indings, the Obama Administration breathed new
life into the AFFH mandate.126 nder new H D leadership, it invested two
years gathering public input from stakeholders127 before promulgating a
inal rule in
.128
The resulting AFFH Rule was a data-driven, process-oriented, teach-agrantee-to- ish approach. The de ining feature was the Assessment of Fair
Housing (AFH), which replaced the AI.129 Responding to repeated clamor,
the AFH is a highly structured reporting framework, to be completed in
con unction with the later-promulgated template known as the Assessment
Tool. 130 Compared to the AI, the AFH provided much clearer guidance and
draws links to other planning tools required of most grantees, such as the
Consolidated Plan.131 Finally and critically, the AFFH Rule required H D to

review). In addition, AIs were not directly linked to a urisdiction’s ConPlan or
PHA’s Five-Year Plan. AIs also had no prescribed schedule for renewal
consequently, many were not updated in a timely fashion. ).
126.

ostic Acolin, supra note 52, at 197 (noting the Obama Administration’s
response to the 2010 GAO REPORT).

127. See Final Rule, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272,
42,272 ( uly 16, 2015) (describing H D’s efforts to gather stakeholder input).
128. d. Accompanying the final AFFH Rule were several notices, which contained
the Assessment Tools customi ed to different types of urisdictions. See infra,
notes 139 144.
129. d. at 42,273 75 (describing how the AFH replaces the AI).
130. d. at 42,273 76. Following the final rule, H D issued supplemental notices
releasing the various Assessment Tools customi ed to various types of
grantees (generally referred to as the Assessment Tool ). See, e. .,
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Assessment Tool for Public Housing
Agencies: Announcement of Final Approved Document, 82 Fed. Reg. 4373
( an. 13, 2017).
131. See, e. ., Gramlich, supra note 125, at 7-30 ( The Assessment Tool refers to
forms or templates provided by H D . . . . The Assessment Tool consists of a
series of questions designed to help program participants identify racially and
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, patterns of integration and
segregation, disparities in access to opportunity, and disproportionate
housing needs . . . . There are separate assessment tools for local urisdictions,
states, and PHAs. ).
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review and approve all AFHs through an iterative process. No longer would
H D rely on a grantee’s word alone.132
The Rule’s preamble described ive ob ectives: ( ) replacing the AI
process with a more effective and standardi ed assessment of fair
housing through which program participants identify and evaluate fair
housing issues and contributing factors, ( ) improving fair housing
assessment and planning by providing H D data to program participants,
who must consider them in their assessment, ( ) explicitly incorporating
fair housing planning into other community planning processes for the irst
time (such as the ConPlan and PHA Plan), ( ) encouraging regional
cooperation to address fair housing, and ( ) providing a more meaningful
public participation process.133
The Rule did not mandate speci ic outcomes, but merely established
parameters to guide grantee planning and investment.134 In other words, it
132. Regulated entities include any urisdiction receiving federal funds for any of
the following programs: CD G, HOME, public housing, and Section 8, among
others. See, e. ., Gramlich, supra note 125, at 7-14 to 7-27 (details the legal
requirements in the authori ing legislation for these programs). Likewise,
states must assure that local units of government receiving these funds
(passed through the state) must comply with AFFH obligations. See also Fair
Housing Planning Guide, .S. DEP’T OF HO S.
R AN DEV. (1996),
https: www.hud.gov sites documents FHPG.PDF https: perma.cc 4Z8 CZMM (describing the applicability and scope of AFFH obligations).
It warrants mention that H D has an internal complaint process. It is possible
that the public may make complaints about a urisdiction’s failure to comply
with the AFFH, but there is little publicly available information about the
complaint process. It appears H D has complete discretion over the process
and there is no public accountability over H D’s internal complaint process,
and therefore no guarantee that a complaint results in an investigation or
enforcement action.
133. 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,273 ( uly 16, 2015).
134. See, e. ., id. at 42,287 (responding to public comments that the final Rule
mandate certain outcomes: H D agrees with the commenters that the AFH
process, to be effective, should have benchmarks and outcomes, but H D
agrees with the later commenters that the final rule should not specify the
benchmarks or mandate certain outcomes. The final rule provides for the
establishment of benchmarks, but established by the program participant and
not H D. However, as a part of the AFH review process, H D will include
review of benchmarks and outcomes, as reflected in a program participant’s
goals. ) see also id. at 42,313 (responding to public comments to the proposed
rule that preceded the 2015 final Rule requesting more robust enforcement
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went to great lengths to emphasi e that every community is unique, and the
AFH process would respect local insight into the causes and best remedies
to local fair housing barriers.135 ut this is not to say that it did not have an
measures: H D understands the commenters’ concerns regarding the
absence of an enforcement provision in this final rule with respect to the
AFFH mandate . This final rule, however, is a planning rule, not a rule
directed to the enforcement of the duty to affirmatively further fair housing.
As a planning mechanism, this rule provides for a review by H D of the AFH
to determine compliance with the standards set forth in promulgated
regulations and for acceptance, or nonacceptance and resubmission (in the
case of nonacceptance) of an AFH if the AFH fails to meet these standards.
While H D declines to include a provision in this planning rule that would
specifically set out the process for enforcing the AFFH mandate , H D notes
that it already has the authority to enforce this statutory obligation and that
H D uses its existing regulations and processes to accept complaints and
conduct compliance reviews. ). For a list of H D’s primary enforcement tools,
see .S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ARE RIGHTS A REALITY : EVAL ATING FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 227 29 (Nov. 21, 2019), https: www.usccr.gov pubs
https: perma.cc 393R-CCV8
2019 11-21-Are-Rights-a-Reality.pdf
(compiling testimony on H D’s limited workforce and civil rights
enforcement capacity).
135. This deference to local insight is particularly noteworthy since the AFFH’s
primary controversy is rooted in ideological disagreement over the role of the
federal government in addressing housing segregation. This debate is
expressed in concern over the AFFH’s reach into decision-making
traditionally within local purview, such as local oning, local expenditures,
and city planning. The debate predates the original Act and remains central,
as illustrated in the public comments in both the 2015 AFFH Rule and 2020
proposed rule. Compare, e. ., Michael Hendrix, Opinion, Freer Housin is
Fairer Housin
H D Should ie Fundin to Looser onin , THE HILL (Nov. 1,
2019),
https: thehill.com opinion civil-rights 468060-freer-housing-isfairer-housing-hud-should-tie-funding-to-looser- oning
https: perma.cc MA4Z-NW 9 (advocating an approach that incentivi es
local decision-making but leaves local urisdictions substantial discretion)
( To be clear, oning reform should not be enacted at the federal level. State
and local leaders are responsible for ensuring their land-use regulations do
not stand in the way of markets offering a greater supply and variety of
housing wherever there is a demand for it. ) with Debby Goldberg Morgan
Williams, Opinion, onin s ot the Answer to All ur Housin Problems, THE
HILL (Nov. 7, 2019), https: thehill.com opinion civil-rights 469009- oningis-not-the-answer-to-all-our-housing-problems
https: perma.cc W 9YGND (arguing in federalism terms that the existing AFFH Rule actually
provides urisdictions more flexibility and the 2020 proposed rule handcuffs
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eye toward outcomes. The Rule required grantees to explain how they would
use federal resources to overcome speci ic impediments and required them
to report back on progress in subsequent submissions.136
An AFH report was the grantee’s inal work product to H D. It featured
data analysis, assessment of the speci ic fair housing challenges facing the
community, identi ication of fair housing priorities and goals, strategies and
actions for implementing the goals, and review of progress achieved since
the previous AFH.137 It departed from the AI process in meaningful ways:
( ) De initions: It de ined terms not de ined in statute, including
af irmatively furthering fair housing 138
(2) Guidance: It described how to analy e fair housing
impediments.139

local urisdictions with a one-si e federal mandate) ( The existing H D
rule . . . is designed to serve ust this purpose by providing urisdictions with
a process to review their markets, including oning and land use restrictions,
and identify nuanced local solutions . . . . Requiring local communities to
employ a single, federally-mandated strategy to reduce oning restrictions . . .
robs local governments of the ability to devise multifaceted, locally-tailored
solutions. ).
136. E. ., 24 C.F.R. 5.154(d)(4) (2015) (identification of fair housing priorities
and goals 5.154(d)(5) (2015) (implementation) and 5.154(d)(7) (2015)
(analysis of progress since prior AFH).
137. 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,355 56 ( uly 16, 2015).
138. See, e. ., id. at 42,253 54 (definitions). The Rule defines affirmatively further
fair housing as taking meaningful actions, in addition to combatting
discrimination, that overcome patterns of segregation and foster inclusive
communities free from barriers that restrict access to opportunity based on
protected characteristics. d. It elaborates: meaningful actions that, taken
together, address significant disparities in housing needs and in access to
opportunity, replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated and
balanced living patterns, transforming racially and ethnically concentrated
areas of poverty into areas of opportunity, and fostering and maintaining
compliance with civil rights and fair housing laws. The duty . . . e tends to all
of a pro ram participant s activities and pro rams relatin to housin and
urban development.’ 24 C.F.R. 5.152 (2015) (emphasis added).
139. 80 Fed. Reg., supra note 137, at 42,355 57. This is a noteworthy change, as the
previous guidance, the 1996 Planning Guide, did not have the authority of law.
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(3) Data: H D supplied relevant data for the specific locality and
region, which the grantee had the option to supplement with
additional local data 140
(4) Oversight: It required submission to H D 141
(5) Coordinated Planning: It defined the relationship between
AFHs and other required planning documents 142 and
(6) Deadlines: It required submission at least every five years,
staggered by urisdiction.143 Early analysis of the AFFH Rule
revealed two encouraging observations: First, it attempted to shift
compliance
toward
a
routine,
non-adversarial even
144
collaborative process.
In other words, it attempted to
normali e compliance and make it less threatening to local control.
This is critical in light of recent AFFH history. Fearing liability in
lawsuits like Westchester yet lacking clear guidance
urisdictions were reluctant to discuss their AFFH activities with the
federal government under the deficient AI schema. A nonadversarial approach is more likely to garner accurate, forthright
information and encouraging compliance over time. Second, the
Rule was iterative by design. It involved a back-and-forth
conversation between H D and the urisdiction at the at multiple
stages, leaving room for reflection and revision. Thus, it sent a
better message: resubmission was not failure, ust one step in a
multi-step process designed to better understand and overcome
that urisdiction’s challenges.

140. d. at 42,272 73.
141. d. at 42,272, 42,313, 42,316, 42,355, 42,357 58 ( uly 16, 2015) (describing
submission and resubmission) 24 C.F.R.
5.160 (2015) (describing
submission deadlines, frequency, and certification requirements).
142. d. at 42,273.
143. d. at 42,357 58 (describing staggered submission requirements).
144. d. at 247.
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While ust a few do en urisdictions completed the new process, their
feedback was promising.145 The new Rule was the government’s irst
meaningful attempt to exercise its AFFH mandate in nearly ifty years.146

145. The City of Los Angeles’s AFH experience is representative. It conducted a
months-long AFH only to receive an unexpected letter from H D on day 59 of
the 60-day review period stating that its AFH would no longer be reviewed
because H D had extended the submission deadline by two years (later
proposing to suspend AFH submission indefinitely). Nevertheless, the city
described the AFH process as thoughtful and engaging, and therefore, time
well spent to develop a set of meaningful goals and strategies. See Los Angeles
Housing and Community Investment Department, Comment Letter on
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Extension of Deadline for Submission
of Assessment of Fair Housing for Consolidated Plan Participants (Mar. 6,
2018), at 1, https: www.regulations.gov contentStreamer documentId H
D-2018-0001-0042 attachmentNumber 1 contentType pdf
https: perma.cc DC 5-5S2 . The City went on to say that it fully
support ed H D’s continued implementation of the 2015 AFFH rule and
oppose d efforts to continue to delay its implementation. The decision to
delay implementing the AFFH rule announced in the Notice was sudden. It
therefore respectfully request ed that H D rescind its suspension notice
and immediately resume implementation of the AFFH rule, while proceeding
to improve the AFFH Data and Mapping Tool and the ser Interface. d. at 2.
The City’s letter is one representative opinion among a variety of urisdictions
that urged H D to continue the AFFH Rule and illustrates that H D’s reasons
for rolling back the Rule particularly that the AFH was an ineffective
process are disingenuous.
146. See ustin Steil
Nicholas elly, he Fairest of hem All Analy in
Affirmatively Furtherin Fair Housin Compliance, 29 HO SING POL’Y DE ATE 85,
85 105 (2019) see also Third Declaration of ustin Steil, at 2 20, Nat’l Fair
Hous. All. v. Carson, Civ. No. 1:18-cv-1076- AH (D.D.C. une 26, 2018) (No. 371) (describing the measurable comparative benefits of AFHs in overcoming
barriers to fair housing).
The Clinton Administration unsuccessfully attempted to promulgate a less
comprehensive AFFH Rule. In 1998, H D issued but later withdrew a
proposed rule. The rule would have clarified the requirements for AFFH
certifications, added standards for H D to assess whether the certifications
were accurate, clarified that the duty was an affirmative one (i.e., inaction
would not suffice), and stated that the penalty for noncompliance would be
the denial of H D funding. See Fair Housing Performance Standards for
Acceptance of Consolidated Plan Certifications and Compliance with
Community Development lock Grant Performance Review Criteria, 63 Fed.
Reg. 57,882 (proposed Oct. 28, 1998).
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II. WHERE WE STAND: THE R LE’S V LNERA ILITY
The new AFFH Rule was short-lived. In 2018, the Trump Administration
pulled the rug out. H D’s heel-turn handily illustrates why the AFFH
mandate should not be enforced by regulation alone. As long as its key
features are defined by regulation not statute they remain virtually
defenseless to ideological revision. This Section dissects recent
developments as a case study for why Congress should amend the AFFH
mandate in statute.
This Section also grounds the AFFH mandate in the current moment:
We live in a racist ecosystem that is defined by stubbornly entrenched
segregation. This segregation has far-reaching repercussions ones that we
should keep front of mind because they influence nearly all other forms of
racial inequality being protested in the streets. To deconstruct segregation,
we need a legal framework that normali es local compliance, backed by
federal resources and accountability.
A. Re ulatory Rollback
In anuary 2018, H D suspended the AFH submission deadline for
grantees, effectively delaying the AFFH process by more than five years.147
It even suspended the deadline for grantees already in the submission
process.148 Moreover, it refused to provide feedback, even when a
urisdiction explicitly requested it.149 Delaying in this manner, H D
147. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Extension of Deadline for Submission
of Assessment of Faith Housing for Consolidated Plan Participant ( AFH
Extension Notice ), 83 Fed. Reg. 683, 684 ( an. 5, 2018) (suspending
submission deadlines for most local governments until their next submission
deadline that falls after October 31, 2020 ) see Gramlich, supra note 125, at
7-15 (calculating that three-fourths of the 1,200 local urisdictions would be
delayed until 2025).
148. See id.
149. See, e. ., Los Angeles, supra note 145 ( We were disappointed to receive a
letter from H D on Day 59 of H D’s 60-day review period that stated that our
AFH will no longer be reviewed and accepted due to the two-year AFH
submission extension. Consequently, we received no feedback on our 450page submission nor acceptance from H D which we were looking forward to
receiving. Such acceptance would have given us the additional assurance that
the goals and strategies in our AFH, which are still to be prioriti ed in our
Consolidated Plan, would put the City of Los Angeles on a path forward to
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appeared to be buying time to come up with a new plan that satisfied the
whims of its new leadership.150
Fair housing advocates responded by suing H D for violating the
Administrative Procedure Act.151 Instead of defending its questionable

fulfill the City’s proactive approach to promote fair housing under the new
AFFH rule. ) see also Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing
Choice Assessment
of
Fair
Housing,
L.A. CTY. DEV. A TH.,
wwwa.lacda.org programs community-development-block-grant planshttps: perma.cc 6W3D-L E
and-reports assessment-of-fair-housing
(describing H D’s refusal to accept the City’s AFH under the background
tab).
150. At that point, the Trump Administration’s APA track record was abysmal. See,
e. ., Fred arbash et al., Federal Courts Have Ruled A ainst rump
Administration Policies at Least
imes, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2019),
https: www.washingtonpost.com graphics 2019 politics trumpoverruled https: perma.cc LCD4-H2AL Fred arbash et al., he Real
Reason President rump is Constantly Losin in Court, WASH. POST (March 19,
2019),
https: www.washingtonpost.com world national-security thereal-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court 2019
03 19 f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9 story.html
https: perma.cc NY 9-A T3 oe Sexton, rump, All About Winnin , Sees
Losses
in
Court
Pile
p,
PROP LICA
(Apr.
2,
2019),
https: www.propublica.org article president-donald-trump-losses-fredbarbash-washington-post-q-and-a https: perma.cc 94P5- 9HF . H D’s
attempt to roll back the AFFH was foreseeable long before H D took formal
action. See, e. ., en Carson, Opinion E perimentin with Failed Socialism
A ain, WASH. TIMES, uly 23, 2015, https: www.washingtontimes.com news
2015 ul 23 ben-carson-obamas-housing-rules-try-to-accomplishhttps: perma.cc Y 9P-EVZH Henry Grabar, rump s Rumored Housin
Secretary is Best Known for Keepin His County Se re ated, SLATE (Nov. 14,
2016),
https: slate.com business 2016 11 donald-trump-could-undohttps: perma.cc YA6 obamas-big-hud-initiative-in-desegregation.html
N
Capps, supra note 31 ( This is not the first time that fair housing has
come under the president’s crosshairs, however. Trump pledged as a
candidate in une 2016 to dismantle the AFFH rule in an appearance with
former Westchester County Executive Rob Astorino, who is best known for
his efforts in the decades-long battle to keep lack families out of white
neighborhoods in suburban Yonkers. Carson, too, subscribes to the view that
federal efforts to reduce segregation amount to social engineering.’ ).
151. Complaint, ECF No. 1, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. et al. v. Carson, Civ. 1:18-cv-1076
(DDC) (May 8, 2018). H D took the position that withdrawing the Assessment
Tool did not suspended the AFFH Rule. Plaintiffs argued that withdrawing
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maneuver, H D pivoted. It rescinded its anuary 2018 notice and withdrew
the all-important Assessment Tool, the wind to the Rule’s sail.152 One expert
summari ed the effect of withdrawing the Assessment Tool as reverting to
the defective AI process:
The legal obligation to affirmatively further fair housing continues
for all. However, until a local government is required to submit an
AFH according to the suspension date, their AFFH obligation reverts
to the previous, grossly inadequate protocol of certifying that they
are affirmatively furthering fair housing . . . .153
H D’s ustification for withdrawing the Assessment Tool was
ideological and arguably disingenuous.154 It took the position that the new
Rule still in its infancy was burdensome and flawed. Primarily, it blamed
the re ection rate. It claimed that because H D returned one-third (17 of
49) of first time submissions for revision that the Rule was not working as

the Assessment Tool was the functional equivalent of suspension. See, e. .,
Mem. Op., ECF. No. 55, Civ. 1:18-cv-1076, at 9 (Aug. 26, 2019).
152. Collectively referred to as the Assessment Tool, H D designed three
separate assessment templates tailored to the relevant entity (local
governments, state governments, and public housing authorities). See, e. .,
supra note 131. In withdrawing the Assessment Tool, H D issued three
notices: (1) Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Withdrawal of Notice
Extending the Deadline for Submission of Assessment of Fair Housing for
Consolidated Plan Participants, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,928 (May 23, 2018) (2)
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Withdrawal of the Assessment Tool for
Local Governments, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,922 (May 23, 2018) and (3) Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH): Responsibility to Conduct Analysis of
Impediments, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,927 (May 23, 2018). See Press Release, .S.
Dep’t of Hous.
rban Dev., H D Announces t Will Publish hree Federal
Re ister otices (May 18, 2018), https: web.archive.org web 2020060414
1627 https: www.hudexchange.info nnew hud-announces-it-willsee
publish-three-federal-register-notices https: perma.cc 9 F7-DFT
also Gramlich, supra note 125, at 7-15 ( The third notice acknowledged that
without the Assessment Tool there can be no AFH. )
153. Gramlich, supra note 125, at 7-15.
154. See, e. ., eff Andrews, he Fair Housin Rule Ben Carson s H D Wants to Delay,
E plained, C R ED ( an. 26, 2018) Gramlich, supra note 125, at 7-15 to 7-16
(discussing H D’s proffered ustifications for its drastic and indefinite
rule suspension).
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an effective device. 155 Among the predicaments with its proffered
explanation is that H D purposefully designed the submission process as
an iterative one with requests for resubmission as an intentional design
to move urisdictions toward better analysis and, ultimately, better
outcomes.156 Likewise, in issuing the final AFFH Rule, H D fully recogni ed
its need to scale up its resources, and took the initial step of staggering
submissions to spread the workload.157 The more credible explanation for
H D’s withdrawal of the Assessment Tool is that new leadership simply
disagreed with what it perceived as a race-conscious, top-down federal
mandate. So, H D simply rewrote it.158
ltimately, the APA lawsuit challenging H D’s maneuver was
unsuccessful.159 Regardless, H D’s move was a temporary placeholder.
155. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Withdrawal of the Assessment Tool for
Local Governments, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,922, 23,923 (May 23, 2018).
156. In its notice of a final rule, H D acknowledged its anticipated challenges with
respect to scaling staffing and other resources to provide adequate technical
assistance and AFH review. See Final Rule, Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,350 ( uly 16, 2015) ( H D itself will need to
hire staff to implement the rule provide data support and review submitted
AFHs ).
157. d. see also id. at 42,314 ( H D believes that a staggered submission deadline,
as recommended by many commenters, would be helpful not only to H D but
to program participants. . . . ).
158. As discussed infra II.A, the proposed rule issued in anuary 2020 strongly
reinforces this view, as does a critical mass of public comments from
ideologically aligned think-tanks and industries with vested financial
interests, infra note 161.
159. In ational Fair Housin Alliance et al. v. Carson, the plaintiffs alleged three
causes of action for violation of the Administrative Procedures Act and sought
a preliminary in unction to reinstate the 2015 Rule. Complaint, ECF No. 1, Civ.
1:18-cv-1076 (DDC) (May 8, 2018). When H D rescinded its original
suspension notice and withdrew the Assessment Tool, the plaintiffs amended
their complaint. Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 48 (Sept. 14, 2018).
H D filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. A close case, the district
court dismissed the action for lack of organi ational standing. Memorandum
Opinion, ECF No. 47, at 37 (Aug. 17, 2018). In the alternative, the court
addressed the merits to the extent necessary to resolve the preliminary
in unction request (e.g., determining the plaintiffs had not established a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits). d. at 55 73. The plaintiffs
filed a motion to amend the udgment and motion for leave to amend the
complaint. Motion to Alter udgment, ECF No. 48 (Sept. 14, 2018). The
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H D also proceeded with the more formal notice-and-comment rulemaking
process to revise the AFFH Rule. In August 2018, it issued an Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, largely on the basis that the Rule was too
onerous.160 The public submitted 1,586 comments, the vast ma ority of
which supported the existing AFFH Rule.161 Nearly five times as many
comments supported the Obama-era Rule (71 ) as opposed it (15 ).162
Notably, several grantees with first-hand experience completing an
Assessment of Fair Housing were highly supportive.163
In anuary 2020, H D issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking revising
the AFFH Rule.164 The proposed rule embodied some of the most pessimistic
proposed second amended complaint strengthened the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations regarding how H D’s withdrawal of the Assessment Tool harmed
plaintiffs for organi ational standing purposes. d. On the merits, it asserted
that, functionally, the withdrawal suspended the AFH process, and therefore
the AFFH Rule itself. d. A year later, the district court denied the motion,
closing the case. Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 55 (Aug. 26, 2019). The
plaintiffs did not appeal.
160. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and Enhancements, 83
Fed. Reg. 40,713 15 (Aug. 16, 2018).
161. Public comments are available on the federal government’s rulemaking
eGovernment portal. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining
and Enhancements, Docket ID: H D-2018-0060, FR-6123-A-01,
https: www.regulations.gov docket D H D-2018-0060
https: perma.cc 2 SM-V93L see Georgetown niv. Law Ctr. Civil Rights
Clinic Comment Letter to FR-6123-A-01 Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing: Streamlining and Enhancements, October 15, 2018,
https: www.regulations.gov document D H D-2018-0060-0659
https: perma.cc 2FVD-P48R .
162. See id. The remaining comments were largely neutral or suggested minor
tweaks. d. One-fifth of comments in opposition to the existing AFFH Rule were
submitted by public housing authorities (PHAs), which tend to oppose what
they perceive as new, burdensome obligations in the AFFH Rule. See id.
163. d. see Los Angeles, supra note 145 N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Preservation Dev.,
Comment Letter on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Extension of
Deadline for Consolidated Plan Participants (Mar. 6, 2018),
https: www.regulations.gov contentStreamer documentId H D-20180039-0011 attachmentNumber 1 contentType pdf
https: perma.cc 9YV8-2 NM .
164. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 85 Fed. Reg. 2041 ( an. 14, 2020).
Opponents of the AFFH Rule have introduced legislation in Congress to
prohibit the federal government from using its funds to administer,
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predictions: It scrapped the AFH process altogether,165 replaced the socalled top-down directive with a certification, (essentially reverting to
the defective AI process of the 1990s),166 and, third, virtually eliminated the
implement, or enforce the AFFH Rule, and even prohibit it from maintaining a
federal database with information on community racial disparities or
disparities in access to housing. ltimately, when the Senate considered the
FY2017 Transportation and H D funding bill, a similar amendment was
proposed but tabled. Instead, the negotiated result was an amendment that
would prevent H D from using federal funds to direct a grantee to undertake
specific changes to existing oning laws as part of carrying out the final rule
entitled Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing.’ See Pub. L. No. 115-31, 243
(General Provisions for the Department of Housing and rban Development)
P.L. 115-141, 234 (H D General Provisions) see also LI Y PERL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R44557, THE FAIR HO SING ACT: H D OVERSIGHT, PROGRAMS
ACTIVITIES 22 23 (2018) (describing amendments proposed to prevent
implementation of the AFFH rule) Zack Hoopes, Hampden ownship Reverses
Position in H D Fundin
Controversy, SENTINEL ( une 17, 2019),
https: cumberlink.com news local govt-and-politics hampden-townshipreverses-position-in-hud-funding-controversy article c2d1d1b9-d009547d-b524-8daaf50aa81c.html https: perma.cc H4H-F2 5 (describing
how one Pennsylvania township reversed its previous position of re ecting
community development grants from H D after the budget language was
passed, having initially feared federal overreach into local oning laws)
Robert Romano, President rump is Endin the bama Biden Re ulation to
Re one ei hborhoods Alon ncome and Racial Guidelines, DAILY TORCH, uly
20, 2020, http: dailytorch.com 2020 07 president-trump-is-ending-theobama-biden-regulation-to-re one-neighborhoods-along-income-and-racialguidelines https: perma.cc D 8T-7M96 (detailing the legislative response
to the AFFH Rule from 2016 to present, with links to roll call votes). As a
practical matter, the budget language has no legal effect, is a matter of political
optics, as the federal government lacks authority to override a local
urisdiction’s oning regulations. See id. (describing how county officials
question the wisdom of urisdictions that refuse all grant funding to avoid
federal scrutiny, especially because H D has never superseded local oning
laws . . . on its own accord. ). ut, as a matter of political optics, the
administration prevailed.
165. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 85 Fed. Reg. 2041, 2053 54 ( an. 14,
2020) (eliminating 24 C.F.R.
5.151 .154). The rule also removes any
additional AFFH-specific public participation requirements, folding all
planning into the Consolidated Planning process.
166. d. at 2044, 2053 (redefining the AFFH obligation in 5.150 to provide that
H D may consider a failure to meet the duty to affirmatively further fair
housing a violation of program requirements and revising 5.155 to create a
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race-conscious elements, speciously supplanting them with market-based
affordable housing incentives as if building more affordable housing
would address segregation.167
H D offered five official ustifications for rewriting the Rule: (1) high
failure rate for urisdictions during the first round of submissions, (2)
resource burdens on H D (technical assistance), (3) lack of sufficient
tailoring by type of program participant, (4) too much focus on process over
outcomes, and (5) process burdens on H D (generating data and tools).168
Despite sharp criticism,169 H D went further. uoting the Federal
Register verbatim: W hen the President reviewed the proposed rule, he
expressed concern that the H D approach did not go far enough . . . to
new incentive program for building affordable housing) see also id. at 2045
(discussing the new AFFH certification process requiring urisdictions to
identify three goals or obstacles to fair housing choice it plans to address,
within the scope of its influence, to increase fair housing choice. ).
167. See, e. ., id. at 2053 54 (removing reference to segregated living patterns in
5.150) id. (revising 5.155 to create a new incentive program for building
affordable housing) see also id. at 2053 (redefining fair housing choice to
focus on access to affordable housing options within a person’s means. ).
168. d. at 2042 43.
169. See, e. ., Curtis unn, H D s Fair Housin Policies Could Promote Further Racial
Discrimination,
E perts
Say,
N C
NEWS
( an.
22,
2020),
https: www.nbcnews.com news nbcblk hud-s-fair-housing-policiescould-promote-further-racial-discrimination-n1118636
https: perma.cc S57 -8DRN ( Carson’s proposal has enraged and
galvani ed fair housing advocates who insist it would gut’ the AFFH mandate,
which they see as a vital protection against discrimination. ) Lola Fadulu,
rump Pulls Back Efforts to Enforce Housin Dese re ation, N.Y. TIMES ( an. 3,
2020), https: www.nytimes.com 2020 01 03 us politics trump-housingsegregation.html https: perma.cc 7ZE8-G
(describing how the
proposed rule would drastically pare legal definitions back to simply saying
people should live where they choose, within their means, without unlawful
discrimination . . . .’ No mention of segregation appears in the new
definition. ) Solomon Greene Shamus Roller, When a Fair Housing Rule is
Not Fair, THE HILL ( an. 7, 2020), https: thehill.com blogs congressblog politics 477227-when-a-fair-housing-rule-is-not-fair
https: perma.cc 2MWH-CMHE (critici ing the proposed rule for failing to
mention racial segregation or racially concentrated poverty the twin evils
the Fair Housing Act was designed to address. ) Wang, supra note 31
(documenting concerns that the proposal reverts the functions of the AFFH
mandate back to a time when no plans were required by H D and
urisdictions were confused on how they should comply ).
45

YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW

39 : 1

2020

reduce federal control of local housing decisions. . . . The President
therefore asked H D to reconsider the rule to see whether H D could do
more. . . . 170
To pacify the president’s dissatisfaction eerily similar to Nixon’s
displeasure fifty years earlier H D skipped the notice-and-comment
process altogether and issued a new rule, Preserving Community and
Neighborhood Choice. 171 The Replacement Rule repeals not only the
Obama-era AFFH Rule but scraps the Clinton-era Analysis of Impediments
(AI), reverting to essentially nothing.172 It downgrades the governing
standard to a rational basis test: A grantee must simply make a general
commitment that it will use the funds to take active steps to promote fair
housing . . . . AFFH certifications will be deemed sufficient provided the
grantee took any action during the relevant period rationally related to
promoting fair housing, such as helping eliminate housing
discrimination. 173
And thus, in a few short sentences, H D collapsed the Fair Housing Act’s
two distinct mandates anti-discrimination and affirmative integration
into one, essentially writing the AFFH mandate into oblivion.
While the Replacement Rule acknowledges the udicial consensus that
AFFH requires more than simply not discriminating, 174 the new standard
does not reflect that interpretation. Rather, the rational basis standard as

170. Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice, 85 Fed. Reg. 47,901 (Aug.
7, 2020) (the Replacement Rule ) see also Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing, 85 Fed. Reg. 2041 ( an. 14, 2020) (proposed final rule).
171. Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice, 85 Fed. Reg. 47,901 (Aug.
7, 2020). H D claimed authority to bypass the notice-and-comment process
by citing a grants-related APA provision exempting matter s relating to
agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts. d. at 47,904 (citing 5 .S.C. 553(a)(2)) ( ecause this
rule applies only to the AFFH obligations of grantees, it is exempt under the
APA. ). This questionable claim appears ripe for legal challenge.
172. H D claimed authority to bypass the notice-and-comment process by citing a
grants-related APA provision exempting matter relating to agency
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts. d. at 47,904 (citing 5 .S.C. 553(a)(2)) ( ecause this rule
applies only to the AFFH obligations of grantees, it is exempt under the APA. ).
This claim seems ripe for legal challenge.
173. d. at 47,904.
174. d. at 47,902.
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articulated in the Replacement Rule has the effect of rubberstamping nearly
any local decision, allowing local urisdictions to carry on as usual.
It is important to not overlook the racially charged context and manner
in which the Replacement Rule was announced. President Trump revealed
the rollback in a series of Tweets in the summer of 2020 as racial protests
raged in the streets.175 He directed the Tweets to suburban residents a key
voting bloc that delivered him the White House in 2016 but then flipped to
give Democrats control of the .S. House of Representatives two years
later.176 Next, Trump co-authored a Wall Street ournal op-ed with H D
Secretary en Carson, which read as a long-form version of the Tweets,
claiming the AFFH was a radical social engineering pro ect that would have
transformed the suburbs from the top down and drawing on fear-based
themes that presidential candidate oe iden’s America was a dystopian
vision of building low-income housing units next to your suburban
house. 177 Another GOP politician went so far as to describe iden’s vision
for the future as a horror film really. They’ll disarm you, empty the prisons,
lock you in your home and invite MS-13 to live next door. 178 This series of
175. E. ., Donald . Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER ( uly 29, 2020, 12:19
PM), https: twitter.com realDonaldTrump status 1288509568578777088
https: perma.cc H9Z-53 9 ( I am happy to inform all the people living
their Suburban Lifestyle Dream that you will no longer be bothered or
financially hurt by having low income housing built in your
neighborhood. . . . ) Donald . Trump (@realDonaldTrump), T WITTER ( uly 29,
2020,
12:19
PM),
https: twitter.com realDonaldTrump status
1288509572223651840 https: perma.cc
H4- WHD ( Your housing
prices will go up based on the market and crime will go down. I have rescinded
the Obama- iden AFFH Rule En oy ) Sylvan Lane, rump Claims Decision to
Repeal Fair Housin Rule Will Boost Home Prices, Lower Crime, THE HILL ( uly
29,
2020),
https: thehill.com policy finance 509595-trump-claimsdecision-to-repeal-fair-housing-rule-will-boost-home-prices-lower
https: perma.cc VAE5- 354 .
176. See, e. ., Sean McMinn, Where the Suburbs Moved Left and How the Shift
Swun Elections, NAT’L P . RADIO (Nov. 27, 2018), https: www.npr.org 2018
11 27 668726284 where-the-suburbs-moved-left-and-how-it-swungelections https: perma.cc 2 HM-N 6 .
177. Donald . Trump
en Carson, Opinion, We ll Protect America s Suburbs, WALL
ST. . (Aug. 17, 2020), https: www.ws .com articles well-protect-americassuburbs-11597608133 https: perma.cc M 96-A P .
178. Thomas . Edsall, Opinion, Fear hat We Are Witnessin the End of American
Democracy, NY TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https: www.nytimes.com 2020 08
26 opinion trump-republican-convention-racism.html
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messages, designed to scare suburban voters, has irrefutable racial
underpinnings, ones consistent with a Replacement Rule that eliminates
any race-conscious attempt to reduce segregation.
ltimately, the Trump Administration’s rollback of the AFFH Rule
underscores the ease with which any administration can undo any AFFH
regulations. Thus, while the AFFH mandate has strong statutory
underpinning, 179 its contours will remain in flux until codified in statute.180
B. Entrenched Se re ation
Today’s deeply entrenched segregation and its far-reaching
repercussions reinforce the urgent need for a clear, enforceable AFFH
mandate. In this moment in our collective history we should revisit how
neighborhood segregation influences nearly all other forms of racial
inequality being protested in the streets.
There can be no doubt that segregation persists despite the enactment
of fair housing laws. At least twenty-one metropolitan areas remain hypersegregated.181 y one estimate, approximately ninety percent of all lack
metropolitan residents live in high or very high segregation while only

https: perma.cc 8D8Y-W6AS (quoting GOP Congressman Matt Gaet of
Florida). The term MS-13 refers to one of the world’s largest and arguably
most violent street gangs comprised of Latino men. See, e. ., H ctor Silva
Insight Crime Ctr. for Latin Am. Latino Studies, MS in the Americas,
https: www.insightcrime.org wp-content uploads 2018 02 MS13-in-theAmericas-InSight-Crime-English-3.pdf https: perma.cc DT9-AYHS .
179. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 9.
180. The incoming iden Administration is likely to reinstate the Obama-era AFFH
Rule, or a modified version of it. See supra note 35 (discussing iden’s
commitment to what his campaign called the Obama- iden Administration’s
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule ). For more information on how
the iden Administration should reinstate or modify the rule, see Megan
Haberle, Peter ye
rian nudsen, Revivin and mprovin H D s
Affirmatively Furtherin Fair Housin Re ulation A Practice Based Roadmap,
POVERTY
RACE
RESEARCH
ACTION
CO NCIL
(Dec.
2020),
https: prrac.org pdf improving-affh-roadmap.pdf
https: perma.cc M49M-H7M9 .
181. Massey, supra note 1, at 579 80. For a discussion of what constitutes hypersegregation, see Misra, supra note 20 (defining a hyper-segregated city as
meeting four of five segregation-related criteria).
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ten percent live in moderate segregation and almost none live in low
segregation.182
After passage of the federal Act, segregation briefly decreased and then
plateaued. For most cities, segregation peaked in the 1970s and declined
modestly into the 1980s and onward.183 In 2010, the five most segregated
cities were Milwaukee, Gary, Detroit, Newark, and New York.184 In those
areas, researchers observed little decline in racial segregation since the late
1960s.185 Thus, while segregation may have declined in some regions, it has
displayed remarkable persistence in others.186 Moreover, segregation of
Hispanic from non-Hispanic white residents has increased, rather than
decreased, in the two largest Hispanic communities, in New York and Los
Angeles.187
The repercussions of neighborhood segregation cannot be overstated.
Where we live influences where we go to school where we worship where
we work where we sociali e, and therefore whom we befriend whom we
work with whom we form a family with and ultimately the ideas,
impressions, and frame of reference that form our worldview.
One author on American social institutions described the modern state
of segregation this way:

182. SANDER ET AL., supra note 1 at 10.
183. Massey, supra note 1, at 578 79 Fig.1 (citing ohn R. Logan
rian . Stults,
he Persistence of Se re ation in the Metropolis ew Findin s from the
Census (2011),
https: s4.ad.brown.edu Pro ects Diversity Data
Report report2.pdf https: perma.cc H9LH-8 AL see also Massey Rugh,
supra note 19 (describing trends in residential segregation and spatial
isolation).
184. Massey, supra note 1, at 579.
185. See id.
186. d. see enerally ruce Mitchell
uan Franco, H LC Redlinin Maps he
Persistent Structure of Se re ation and Economic ne uality, NATIONAL
COMM NITY REINVESTMENT COALITION (Mar. 20, 2018), https: ncrc.org holc
https: perma.cc L5L3-WHLR .
187. Massey, supra note 1, at 580 ( Whereas in 1970 the average Hispanic lived in
a census tract that was ust 27 Hispanic, by 2010 the figure stood at 47 . ).
This Article uses the term Hispanic to remain consistent with the
terminology used by the .S. Census ureau and H D. The author
acknowledges this is an imperfect term as many people prefer the terms
Latino, Latina, or Latinx, and does not intend to exclude or otherwise
diminish any person’s identity or experience by using the term Hispanic.
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America’s segregated modern life is marked by three realities: First,
geographic segregation has meant that although places like Ferguson
and altimore may seem like extreme examples most white
Americans continue to live in locales that insulate them from the
obstacles facing many ma ority- lack communities. Second, this legacy,
compounded by self-segregation, has led to a stark result: the
overwhelming ma ority of white Americans don’t have a single close
relationship with a person who isn’t white. Third, there are virtually no
American institutions positioned to resolve these problems. Social
segregation persists in virtually all ma or American institutions.188
Segregation also has far-reaching consequences for quality of life. For
communities of color, segregation is correlated with lower income, lower
quality education, shorter life expectancy, and higher homicide rate, among
other outcomes.189 Moreover, housing discrimination directed at residents
in segregated communities of color is correlated with substantially lower
homeownership rates.190 This difference is critical, as homeownership is
the primary driver of inter-generational accumulation of wealth, and the
race homeownership gap is the primary driver of the country’s racial wealth
gap not income inequality.191 Census ureau data reveals that today’s
lack-white homeownership gap is actually greater than in 1968.192 In
other words, segregation reinforces the mammoth racial wealth gap that
constricts access to opportunity.
We live in a racist ecosystem, and segregation is its defining feature.
Segregation’s implications span nearly all aspects of American life. Its
profound reach speaks to the urgency and need for a policy solution to shore
up the AFFH’s weaknesses.

188. RO

ERT P. ONES, THE END OF WHITE CHRISTIAN AMERICA 155

56 (2016).

189. Acs et al., supra note 2, at 11 13 (income, education, life expectancy, homicide
rate) see also R.A. Hahn et al., supra note 2, at 17 24 (social determinants of
health).
190. Nigel Chiwaya
anell Ross, he American Dream While Black Locked in a
icious Cycle, N C NEWS (Aug. 3, 2020), https: www.nbcnews.com specials
https: perma.cc C Y6american-dream-while-black-homeownership
DT
.
191. d. see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2, at 180 83 (racial wealth gap).
192. Chiwaya
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III. WHERE TO NE T: EFFECTIVE REFORM
Informed by the Fair Housing Act’s most critical flaws, the path forward
is clear. The Act itself must be amended to instill a durable AFFH compliance
process. Amendment necessary to remedy acute enforcement gaps is
long overdue. This Section describes and evaluates three critical
substantive amendments aimed at making the Act a more effective antisegregation tool. Moreover, it anticipates and responds to two likely
critiques the lack of political will and H D’s capacity to enforce a robust
AFFH mandate. It concludes by exploring modest, incremental proposals to
improve the status quo, which should be interpreted as alternative, not
mutually exclusive, reforms.
A. Statutory Amendment
In 2015, it seemed H D had finally found its stride. After years of
planning, it promulgated a thoughtful regulation that balanced competing
interests. The AFFH Rule standardi ed the compliance process with an eye
toward fair housing outcomes.193 It centered local decision-making while
ensuring that localities would remain accountable to the federal
government.194
193. See Assessment of Fair Housing, 24 C.F.R. 5.154(d) (2017) Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,287 ( uly 16, 2015)
(discussing outcomes and amending the final rule in response to comments
recommending that H D strengthen benchmarks to achieve better
outcomes). See enerally ustin Steil Nicholas elly, Snatchin Defeat from
the Jaws of ictory H D Suspends AFFH Rule that was Deliverin Meanin ful
Civil Ri hts Pro ress, POVERTY RACE RESEARCH ACTION CO NCIL (Dec. 1, 2017),
https: prrac.org snatching-defeat-from-the- aws-of-victory-hud-suspendsaffh-rule-that-was-delivering-meaningful-civil-rights-progress
https: perma.cc 5 YL-N4TG (discussing early research suggesting the
Rule was achieving its ob ectives as compared to AIs, like evidence that
grantees who had submitted AFHs had identified significantly more concrete
commitments, innovative goals, and quantifiable metrics for fair housing
success, as opposed to vague goals that make essentially no public
commitment to any defined action and provide minimal ways to measure if
fair housing information is being effectively disseminated and what effect that
dissemination is having on awareness or enforcement of fair housing laws ).
194. See, e. ., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,288
( uly 16, 2015) ( R ecogni ing the importance of local decisionmaking, the
new approach establishes basic parameters to help guide public sector
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The Rule illustrates what can and must be done. Even so, any regulatory
device is unacceptably vulnerable to changing political winds, and the nowrepealed AFFH Rule was no exception.
This Section focuses on three statutory amendments. First, it details
how Congress should incorporate the substantive provisions of the AFFH
Rule into the Act’s statutory text, particularly its definitions and
accountability framework. Second, it recommends creating an express
private right of action as another enforcement mechanism. Third, it
highlights the value of housing mobility programs that, while not a
wholesale solution, can meaningfully enhance access to opportunity in a
society still beset by widespread segregation.
This Section also suggests a paradigm for appraising reforms: whether
the proposal will enhance and normali e a compliance process that instills
a culture of compliance at the local level. In this context, a culture of
compliance means an expectation among local actors that they must
regularly assess and report on the status of fair housing and their efforts to
overcome those impediments. It involves an expectation that the
requirements will be enforced and there will be consequences for noncompliance. It will be a new normal in which the urisdiction’s employees
are properly trained to analy e fair housing impediments, use federal and
local dollars to overcome those impediments, and track outcomes using
targeted metrics and data collection. Ideally, it will be a new normal in
which those employees understand the exceptional opportunity the process
presents to enhance the quality of life and to reduce the negative costs of
segregation in their communities.

housing and community development planning and investment decisions in
being better informed about fair housing concerns and consequently help
program participants be better positioned to fulfill their obligations to
affirmatively further fair housing. ) id. at 42,273 ( The rule covers program
participants that are sub ect to a great diversity of local conditions and
economic and social contexts . . . . The rule provides for program participants
to supplement data provided by H D with available local data and knowledge
and requires them to undertake the analysis of this information to identify
barriers to fair housing. Also, the rule affords program participants
considerable choice and flexibility in formulating goals and priorities to
achieve fair housing outcomes and establishing metrics that will be used to
monitor and document progress. The precise outcomes . . . are uncertain, but
the rule will enable each urisdiction to plan meaningfully. ) id. at 42,311
( I t was also not H D’s intention to be overly prescriptive as to the
standards by which H D will evaluate and determine whether to accept an
AFH. )
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1. Filling the Statutory Void
Today, the AFFH mandate reads ust as enacted in 1968.
Section 3608(e)(5) provides that the Secretary of Housing and rban
Development shall administer the programs and activities relating to
housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the
policies of fair housing . 195 Extending the mandate across the government,
section 3608(d) provides that a ll executive departments and agencies
shall administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban
development (including any Federal agency having regulatory or
supervisory authority over financial institutions) in a manner affirmatively
to further the purposes of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the
H D Secretary to further such purposes. 196
While these phrases leave much to the imagination, the courts and
executive branch have filled in certain details.197 Even so, Congress must
codify those details in statute for the aforementioned reasons. At a
minimum, Congress should fill the statutory void in four ways: (1) insert an
AFFH-specific purpose statement, (2) explicitly clarify the affirmative
obligation the mandate places on all federal agencies and funding recipients,
(3) define key terms like affirmatively further fair housing, and (4) codify
an accountability framework that mimics the AFFH Rule’s balanced
approach.
To reinforce the AFFH mandate’s role as a sibling to the antidiscrimination mandate not distant cousin Congress should amend the
Act to include an AFFH-specific purpose statement. The integration
mandate has been lost in the focus on anti-discrimination.198 Indeed, for
most of its history, the AFFH mandate has been an overlooked opportunity.
An amendment should therefore feature a section on the reasons the
government is required to affirmatively further fair housing, rooted in its
legislative history. Most critically, it should acknowledge the welldocumented history of the government’s role in engineering today’s racial
segregation. It might read:
195. 42 .S.C. 3608(e)(5) (2015).
196. d.

3608(d) (2015).

197. See supra Part II.
198. See, e. ., ostic Acolin, supra note 52 (describing the one-sided focus on the
non-discrimination mandate to the detriment of the AFFH mandate). For a
discussion of how civil rights have been deleteriously reduced to a narrow
focus on non-discrimination at the expense of a broader ustice-seeking
urisprudence, see generally WEST, supra note 24.
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Housing segregation by race and ethnicity is a long-standing and
costly problem that affects all people and communities in the nited
States. It is well documented that official government policies and
practices have contributed to the prevalence and persistence of
segregation. In light of that history, this Act acknowledges the
responsibility of the government to take affirmative steps to
deconstruct segregation. This section reaffirms the commitment of
Congress announced in 1968: It is the policy of the nited States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the nited States. 42 .S.C. 3601. Providing for fair
housing requires the government to do more than refrain from
discriminating. It must proactively dedicate federal resources to
deconstruct barriers to fair housing to reverse the history of
government-initiated and government-perpetuated segregation.199
Such a purpose statement grounds the AFFH mandate in the government’s
well-documented role in engineering the racial segregation of today. It
squarely acknowledges the government’s culpability and reinforces the
need for an affirmative duty.
Second, Congress should amend the Act’s text to make explicit that the
AFFH mandate is an affirmative obligation, as courts have held since its
infancy. For instance, courts have interpreted the mandate as a national
policy of nondiscrimination that imposes an obligation to do more than
simply not discriminate . . . . 200 It requires that a ction must be taken to
fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open integrated residential housing
patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial
groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat. 201 To
satisfy the obligation, the government must consider what factors
significantly contributed to urban flight and what steps must be taken to

199. This would serve as a purpose statement for the AFFH mandate, as opposed
to the more limited purpose statement for the AFH planning process featured
in the 2015 Affirmatively Further Fair Housing rule. 24 C.F.R. 5.150 (2017).
It bears emphasi ing that the AFFH mandate extends to all forms of
segregation by protected class. This purpose statement speaks to the Act’s
legislative history, which demonstrates that segregation by race and ethnicity
were Congress’s primary concern in 1968.
200. See SCHWEMM, supra note 23, at 21:1

nn.19 24 (citing cases).

201. d. at n.27 (quoting Otero v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir.
1973)).
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reverse the trend to prevent the recurrence of such blight. 202 While such
clarification might seem redundant to the phrase affirmatively further,
clarification would put any doubt to rest.
Third, Congress should define key substantive terms, particularly the
phrase affirmatively furthering fair housing. It should begin by adopting
H D’s carefully crafted definition in the 2015 AFFH Rule:
Affirmatively furthering fair housing means taking meaningful
actions, in addition to combating discrimination, that overcome
patterns of segregation and foster inclusive communities free from
barriers that restrict access to opportunity based on protected
characteristics. Specifically, affirmatively furthering fair housing
means taking meaningful actions that, taken together, address
significant disparities in housing needs and in access to
opportunity, replacing segregated living patterns with truly
integrated and balanced living patterns, transforming racially and
ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of opportunity,
and fostering and maintaining compliance with civil rights and fair
housing laws. The duty to affirmatively further fair housing extends
to all of a program participant’s activities and programs relating to
housing and urban development.203
This definition advances several goals. Critically, it would codify for the first
time in statute what it means to affirmatively further the ob ectives of fair
housing: to take meaningful steps to reduce disparities in access to
opportunity, to replace segregated living patterns with integrated and
balanced ones, to transform racially and ethnically concentrated areas of
poverty into areas of opportunity, and to foster grantee compliance with fair
housing laws. In particular, fostering compliance, the final ob ective, tracks
this Article’s focus on creating a compliance norm among local urisdictions.
Congress should also incorporate other relevant definitions that give
substantive meaning and context, including: fair housing choice,
integration, segregation, meaningful action, and significant disparities in
access to opportunity.204
Finally, Congress should explicitly address accountability. Specifically,
it should amend section 3608 to reflect the minimum obligations of local
urisdictions receiving federal funds, H D’s statutory obligation to enforce
202. d. at nn.21 22 (quoting Shannon v. .S. Dep’t of Hous.
809 (3d Cir. 1970)).

rban Dev., 436 F.2d

203. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 24 C.F.R. 5.152 (2017).
204. d.
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this provision, and an accountability framework that mirrors the AFFH Rule.
The open question is a matter of detail. Drafters must decide which details
to include in the statute to simultaneously accomplish the goal of insulating
the AFFH from regulatory rollback without frustrating future attempts to
adapt the AFFH by regulation to improve its effectiveness. In other words,
Congress must strike a balance between increasing local accountability
without handcuffing future attempts to improve the AFFH process.
Amendment could take multiple forms. It might spell out Assessment of
Fair Housing procedures with some specificity, borrowing from the AFFH
Rule. It might include a requirement that local urisdictions perform an
assessment at periodic intervals using data provided by H D and
supplemented by local data, using a H D template (possibly naming an
Assessment Tool). At a minimum, it should state unequivocally that
H D has a statutory obligation to enforce this provision by monitoring local
compliance with the AFFH mandate, and Congress must fund H D at
adequate levels to ensure compliance. Moreover, the amendment should
establish an accountability framework that forestalls H D from reverting to
a meaningless certification process, as existed before the AFFH Rule. It
might even spell out H D’s obligation to collect and maintain AFFH data and
issue a publicly available annual report detailing its enforcement efforts
(available to Congress for oversight). This amendment would increase both
local accountability and give Congress more meaningful oversight authority
if H D fails to satisfy its affirmative duty.
2. Private Right of Action
The most conspicuous omission of the AFFH mandate is the lack of an
express private right of action to enforce it. The Act defines discriminatory
housing practice as a violation of various non-discrimination provisions,
but the definition does not extend to the AFFH mandate.205 This means
private parties cannot use existing statutory enforcement mechanisms in
sections 3610 12 (administrative complaints to H D) or section 3613
(private lawsuits) to enforce the mandate. This Section examines how to
amend the Act to expand private enforcement against local urisdictions
(state and local actors or quasi-governmental actors like public housing

205. 42 .S.C. 3602(f) (2020) (defining discriminatory housing practice as an
act that is unlawful under 3604 (sale or rental of housing practices), 3605
(residential real estate-related transactions), 3606 (brokerage services),
and 3617 (interference, coercion, or intimidation in exercise of protected
rights), but not 3608 (the AFFH mandate)).
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authorities), as opposed to lawsuits against H D itself for failure to
enforce.206 Private action has the potential to increase compliance through
deterrence and cultivate a culture of compliance.
To date, AFFH enforcement lies almost exclusively in H D’s hands,
despite the fact that private citi ens and watchdog groups are a critical
component of the accountability and enforcement mechanism for most civil
rights laws. The National Commission recogni ed this problem in
recommending that H D at least make non-compliance directly actionable
through administrative complaints filed by individuals and
organi ations. 207
This Article necessarily goes further. Informed by the limits of existing
AFFH litigation, it is evident that third parties should be able to directly
enforce the AFFH mandate in a udicial forum, not merely through
administrative complaints. The prospect of private litigation is a critical way
for in ured parties to force meaningful action when H D is intransigent. Put
another way, private lawsuits will be most effective and needed when
H D shirks its affirmative duty to enforce the AFFH mandate.
The case for an express private right of action is built on the reality that
an agency alone should not be the sole enforcement body, if for no other
reason than H D has proven inconsistent and unreliable at enforcing the
mandate. At the same time, we must be cogni ant that private action
standing alone cannot reali e the Act’s ob ectives. ust as in the antidiscrimination context (the Act’s twin ob ective), it is more effective to pair
government and private action, one reinforcing the other.208

206. Robert Schwemm recounts the tortured history of actions against H D in his
21:5-21:7 (citing
comprehensive treatise. SCHWEMM, supra note 23, at
cases). Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, readers should note the
First Circuit’s more expansive interpretation of H D’s AFFH obligations, see
AACP v. Sec y of Hous. & rban Dev., 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987), as
compared to the Eleventh Circuit, Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 737 F.2d
1530 (11th Cir. 1984), which was later followed by the Fourth Circuit, Atkins
v. Robinson, 733 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1984), and Sixth Circuit, Jaimes v. oledo
Met. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1985). The full extent of H D’s AFFH
obligations has yet to be determined.
207. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 46. For the National
Commission’s discussion of the AFFH mandate and recommendations to
improve AFFH compliance, see id. at 37 43.
208. On the limits of a civil rights urisprudence centered on the antidiscrimination mandate, see generally WEST, supra note 23 (examining the
comparative advantages of rooting civil rights in natural law).
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For much of the Act’s history, private action has been the backbone of
anti-discrimination enforcement.209 Prior to 1988, the Act did not authori e
H D to take meaningful action to ad udicate complaints.210 Rather, it
appears Congress assumed that the primary enforcement mechanism
would be private action.211 Congress remedied that in 1988 by expanding
H D’s authority to address residential discrimination. Since then, private
actions have played a more complementary role in enforcement.212
209. See, e. ., MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at 197 ( This provision for individual
litigation under the anti-discrimination mandate was the primary
mechanism that Congress created to enforce the Fair Housing Act. According
to the Supreme Court, H D has no power of enforcement,’ and the act’s main
enforcement mechanism must be private suits in which the complainant acts
not only on their own behalf but also as private attorneys general in
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.’
(quoting rafficante v. Metro. Life ns. Co., 409 .S. 205, 209 (1972))).
210. d. (discussing the enforcement structure prior to the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988) ( During the 1970s and 1980s, therefore,
discriminators had little to fear from H D or the ustice Department, and
people who believed they had suffered racial discrimination were forced to
initiate legal proceedings on their own. ).
211. d. at 197 98. Prior to 1988, private litigation had its own weaknesses,
including that complainants were only entitled to sue for actual damages and
a mere $1,000 in punitive awards, had to pay their own court costs and
attorney’s fees unless the court ruled they were financially unable to assume
the burden and were sub ect to a short statute of limitations of 180 days or
30 days from the end of H D mediation. The resulting contest was inherently
unequal, so that enforcement efforts were intrinsically flawed and
structurally condemned to ineffectiveness . . . . In practice . . . the Act allowed
a few victims to gain redress, but it permitted a larger system of
institutionali ed discrimination to remain in place. d. at 198.
Certainly, the .S. Department of ustice achieved some landmark fair housing
victories. See, e. ., nited States v. City of lack ack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1974) nited States v. Yonkers d. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). It also appeared to take more cases after Congress amended
the FHA in 1988. See, e. ., Leland . Ware, ew Weapons for an ld Battle he
Enforcement Provisions of the
Amendments to the Fair Housin Act, 7
ADMIN. L. . 59, 106 07 (1993).
212. See, e. ., MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at 205 12 (describing glimmers of
hope but cautioning that the amendments still lean heavily on the efforts of
individuals, and success will be heavily determined by the institutional
backing given to these private attorneys general’ by the President, the ustice
Department, and H D.’ ).
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In the AFFH context, private enforcement has been stymied by the lack
of an express private right of action to enforce the AFFH mandate, 42 .S.C.
3608. Perhaps the most significant breakthrough in AFFH enforcement
came when private actors sued Westchester County on a False Claims Act
theory.213 ut such claims have limited application.214 They are only likely
to prevail where a grantee literally falsified its federal grant application by
failing to undertake even a nominal fair housing analysis of race. Since the
historic Westchester settlement, grantees have presumably taken steps to
insulate themselves from false claims liability.
While private litigation has played a consequential role in enforcement,
it is not a panacea. In many ways it is inferior to public enforcement. The
federal government has incomparably better leverage and reach to instill a
culture of compliance across local governments. It cannot be denied that
H D’s vast transfer of resources to local grantees is the primary leverage
point available to enforce the AFFH mandate. The federal government thus
wields the most effective carrots and sticks.215
213. Supra Part II.A.4.
214. d. For an extended discussion, see Hayes, supra note 105 (discussing postWestchester legal developments, including the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, at 10104( )(2), which
lowered the public disclosure bar, which had been one of the most difficult
barriers for realtors to overcome in pursuing FCA actions, and reversed a
recent Supreme Court decision Graham County Soil & Water Conservation
District v. nited States e rel. Wilson, 559 .S. 280 (2010) holding that
disclosures in state or local government reports or proceedings barred
actions ).
215. See, e. ., ostic Acolin, supra note 52, at 191 (discussing the AFFH mandate’s
carrots and sticks). Some urisdictions opt out of federal funding for housing
and community development (e.g., Community Development lock Grants) to
avoid the binding stipulations. Such urisdictions tend to be more affluent
communities, although not exclusively. See Hoopes, supra note 164
(discussing one community’s decision-making process on federal funding in
light of AFFH requirements). To the extent that H. .D.’s community
development funds are not sufficiently enticing, .S. Department of
Transportation dollars are considerably larger, and thereby more tempting,
with the result that that few local urisdictions are willing to leave them on the
table. The AFFH mandate’s broad text extends to all programs and activities
relating to housing and urban development in a ll executive department
and agencies, which may implicate a variety of grant programs related to
urban development, from infrastructure to sewers to highways. See 42 .S.C.
3608(d) (2015). Thus, D.O.T. funding could provide significant additional
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Empirically, H D has proven that it will not consistently enforce the
AFFH mandate. Where H D neglects its duties, there must be outside
leverage to compel action. Accordingly, while Congress should strengthen,
or at least clarify, H D’s AFFH duties, a private right of action is critical.
One way to establish an express private right of action is simply to
amend the definition of discriminatory housing practice to include
violations of the AFFH mandate. For instance, 802(f), codified as 42 .S.C.
3602(f), could be amended as follows: (f) Discriminatory housing
practice means an act that is unlawful under section 804, 805, 806, or 818
of this title, or failure to comply with section
d or any re ulation
216
promul atin section
d.
This amendment would allow private
litigants to use existing enforcement mechanisms in 42 .S.C. 3613. One
resolution to enact a similar amendment has been introduced in the .S.
House of Representatives.217
Alternatively, Congress could fashion a new AFFH enforcement
provision that details the elements of a cause of action. This approach may
provide more predictability to local urisdictions and thereby enhance
deterrence. Its exact form depends on how Congress describes a
urisdiction’s AFFH obligations within the statutory text. For guidance on
the elements of a private cause of action against local urisdictions, drafters
might look to the First Circuit’s discussion of a cause of action against H D
in AACP Boston Chapter v. H D.218 In that case, a local NAACP chapter sued
H D for failing to aggressively enforce its AFFH duties against the City of
oston. Proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), thenFirst Circuit udge Stephen reyer described the standard:
leverage to incentivi e compliance. This is the sub ect of a forthcoming article.
For a parallel discussion of the mandate’s application to Treasury Department
funds, see Schwemm, supra note 55, at 146 47 nn.129 30 (citing . William
Callison, Achievin
ur Country Geo raphic Dese re ation and the Low
ncome Housin
a Credit, 19 S. CAL. REV. L SOC. ST. 213, 225 (2010)
Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates nsatisfied he Low ncome Housin
a Credit Pro ram and the Civil Ri hts Laws, 52 MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1029 49
(1998) and 26 C.F.R. 1.42-9(a)).
216. The italici ed text reflects the amended language.
217. At least one bill has been introduced in Congress proposing a substantially
similar amendment. Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, H.R.
6500, 111th Cong. (2010) (redefining discriminatory housing practice to
include violation of 808(e)(5)). The bill never saw a committee hearing or
vote. More effective would be including all AFFH violations by all agencies
under 3608(d), not solely H D under 3608(e)(5).
218. NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous.
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T he court must decide whether, over time, H D’s pattern reveals
a failure to live up to its obligation under 3608 . The standard for
reviewing that pattern can be drawn directly from the statutory
instruction to administer its programs in a manner affirmatively
to further the policies of fair housing. This standard, like many,
may be difficult to apply to borderline instances, yet a court should
be able to determine clear failure to live up to the instruction over
time. . . . T his case seems to call for a more straightforward
evaluation of whether agency activity over time has furthered the
statutory goal, and, if not, for an explanation of why not and a
determination of whether a given explanation, in light of the statute,
is satisfactory.219
In other words, the First Circuit recogni ed as legally cogni able a claim for
violation of the APA where H D failed, over time, to fulfill its statutory
obligation to administer its programs in a manner that affirmatively
furthered fair housing ob ectives.
Directing a similar challenge against a local urisdiction (for violation of
the Fair Housing Act, as opposed to the APA), at least two theories of liability
may be available. The broader theory would be a urisdiction’s failure to
comply with the AFFH over time. This is most comparable to the APA
challenge above. A urisdiction might be liable for failing to assess barriers
to fair housing and take affirmative steps to overcome those barriers.
Liability might turn on the broader question of whether the urisdiction
received federal funding but failed to take meaningful action to address fair
housing barriers, more likely in terms of process or effort than outcomes.220
A narrower theory would be liability for material noncompliance with
specific AFFH obligations, such as the failure to submit an AFH, failure to
consider and analy e data that could materially alter its fair housing
analysis, or failure to provide meaningful opportunities for public
participation. Relief would be commensurate with the nature of the material
violation, in light of the most suitable remedy to advance fair housing
ob ectives. For predictability and deterrence, H D should promulgate
guidance as to what constitutes a material violation, ideally based on
examples from Congress in a committee report or other legislative history.
A word of caution, drafters must be cogni ant of the history of reluctance
among local urisdictions to transparently report their progress or lack
219. d. at 158 (citations omitted).
220. This proposal naturally raises the question of who has standing to sue. For a
discussion of existing standing caselaw in the context of 3608, see S CHWEMM,
supra note 23, at 12A:7.
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thereof for fear of liability. The best approach is likely to strike a balance
similar to the AFFH Rule, which is not overly punitive and builds in
procedures for resubmission.221 Regardless of its precise form, an express
private right of action has the potential to meaningfully enhance AFFH
enforcement by holding local urisdictions more accountable.
3. Mobility Programs

Other Statutory Enhancements

Inextricably intertwined with the concept of housing integration is
housing mobility the freedom to move between neighborhoods. This
Section explores the benefits of amending the Act to complement the AFFH
mandate, with a particular emphasis on statutory enhancements that would
improve voluntary mobility across neighborhoods within any community.
One increasingly common proposal is to amend the Act to make source
of income a new protected class. This proposal straddles both the
integration and anti-discrimination mandates of the Act by making it
unlawful to re ect tenants who pay their rent with government-subsidi ed
rental assistance, opening communities to more diverse renters.222
221. See 24 C.F.R. 5.162 (2015) (AFH review) 24 C.F.R. 5.164 (2015) (revision
and resubmission) 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,311 312 (responding to public
comments on the review process).
222. While this Article embraces mobility as one tool to deconstruct segregation, it
does not endorse mobility over place-based investment. Nor does it seek to
ideali e or overstate the benefits of mobility programs. Mobility is not a
panacea to dismantle segregation. Among their downsides, mobility programs
tend to place one-sided burdens on communities of color because they
frequently involve voluntary relocation of communities of color to
predominantly white high opportunity communities. Many valid critiques of
mobility programs exist, including their failure to address the root causes of
poverty, toxic stress, and the racism that led to lack urban ghettos. Arline
T. Geronimus . . Phillip Thompson, o Deni rate, nore, or Disrupt Racial
ne uality in Health and mpact of a Policy induced Breakdown in African
American Communities, 1 D
OIS REV.
247, 247 79 (2004),
https: www.cambridge.org core ournals du-bois-review-social-scienceresearch-on-race article to-denigrate-ignore-or-disrupt-racial-inequalityin-health-and-the-impact-of-a-policyinduced-breakdown-of-africanamerican-communities 6E8565ECC036 7F8456AE0E23261AE9C
https: perma.cc VG48-NS M (critici ing the Moving to Opportunity
mobility study of the 1990s).
With that in mind, segregation can also yield disproportionate harms for
communities of color that must be acknowledged harms that warrant the
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Currently, seventeen states and approximately ninety cities and
counties prohibit source-of-income discrimination.223 This protection
serves to minimi e disparate treatment for people who pay rent with a
disfavored source of income typically housing vouchers. Source of income
protection also benefits veterans who receive government benefits as a
result of military service, another status sub ect to some negative
stereotypes.224
option of offering voluntary mobility as one avenue to reduce fair housing
barriers and open housing opportunities. See, e. ., INST. ON METRO. OPPORT NITY,
AMERICAN NEIGH ORHOOD CHANGE IN THE 21ST CENT RY 28 34 (Apr. 2019),
https: www.law.umn.edu sites law.umn.edu files metro-files american
neighborhood change in the 21st century - full report - 4-1-2019.pdf
https: perma.cc PV58- G 4 . This is especially true in light of research
documenting the significant quality-of-life outcomes associated with
voluntary mobility programs. E. ., Chetty et al., supra note 37.
For a discussion of a balanced approach that balances both place-based and
mobility strategies as opposed to prioriti ing one over the other see ohn
A. Powell Stephen Menendian, pportunity Communities vercomin the
Debate over Mobility ersus Place Based Strate ies, in THE FIGHT FOR FAIR
HO SING 207 27 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2018) see also Edward G. Goet
Myron Orfield, p for Discussion Re ionalism and Affordable Housin , 2 .
COMP. COMM. DEV. (Dec. 2011), http: archive.instituteccd.org news 3262
https: perma.cc 38G -E R6 (illustrating the debate over place-based
versus mobility strategies) Sara Pratt, Civil Ri hts Strate ies to ncrease
Mobility, 127 YALE L. . FOR M 498, 518 nn.100 01 (2017) ( Any discussion
of mobility in the civil rights context must consider the concomitant obligation
of communities to invest in neighborhoods and segregated and poor areas,
which H D and others refer to as a balanced approach.’ ) Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,278 ( uly 16, 2015)
(clarifying that the AFFH Rule does not prioriti e mobility strategies over
place-based investment but allows urisdictions to decide).
223. POVERTY
RACE RESEARCH ACTION CO NCIL, E PANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR
ILDING A S CCESSF L HO SING MO ILITY PROGRAM (Dec. 11,
2019),
at
App.
,
https: prrac.org pdf Appendix .pdf
https: perma.cc A8 -7LDC (cataloguing the patchwork of state and local
source-of-income laws).
224. A bill that reflects an attempt to address discrimination against veterans
proposes the addition of both source-of-income and veterans-status
protections to the Fair Housing Act. Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2018, S.
3612 115th Cong. (2018) (prohibiting housing discrimination based on
source of income or veteran status ) see also Press Release, .S. Senator Tim
aine, aine, Hatch ill Would Protect Veterans, Low-Income Families From
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It is not novel to require equal treatment of renters regardless of what
legal source of income they use to they pay their rent. Indeed, some cities
and states passed laws as early as the 1970s and 1980s to prohibit source
of income discrimination.225 Most state and local protections define source
of income to expressly include government-subsidi ed rental assistance.226
The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program (commonly referred to as
Section 8) is the federal government’s principal subsidi ed housing
program for extremely low-income families, the elderly, and individuals
with disabilities.227 H D provides funding for the HCV program through
local public housing authorities (PHAs), which administer the program
locally.228
Housing Discrimination (Nov. 13, 2018),
https: www.kaine.senate.gov press-releases kaine-hatch-introducebipartisan-bill-to-protect-veterans-and-low-income-families-from-housing.
discrimination https: perma.cc DAF3-D
225. See POVERTY RACE RESEARCH ACTION CO NCIL, supra note 223, at app. (listing
laws by state and enactment date, including early adopters like Massachusetts
(1971), Maine (1975), North Dakota (1983), and Oklahoma (1985)) see also
Robert Schwemm, Source of ncome Discrimination and the Fair Housin Act,
70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 573, 591 (forthcoming 2020) (describing the recent
momentum in adoption of these laws) ( A handful of these laws date back to
the 1970s and another twenty were passed in the 1980s and 1990s, but
most over fifty have been enacted since 2000, with New York state and Los
Angeles (both city and county) being the most recent. ).
226. See POVERTY

RACE RESEARCH ACTION CO

NCIL, supra note 223, at App.

.

227. See Complaint, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Evolve LLC, No. 1:19-cv-1147 (D.D.C.)
(citing Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
Title II, 201(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 66, now codified at 42 .S.C. 1437f 24
C.F.R.
982.1 et se .). This description of the Housing Choice Voucher
Program and source of income discrimination was drafted in collaboration
with court-certified student attorneys in the Georgetown niversity Law
Center’s Civil Rights Clinic. See id. at 4 5.
228. The HCV program makes rent affordable by fixing the family’s portion of rent
to its household income. If a voucher holder finds eligible housing, she pays a
percentage (generally 30 percent) of her household income to the landlord
and the PHA pays the landlord the remaining market-value rent. See 24 C.F.R.
5.628 (total tenant payment) 982.505(b) (monthly assistance payment).
For instance, a low-income family with a monthly household income of $1,500
might pay $500 for an apartment with a market-rate rent of $1,200 and the
PHA would pay the remaining $750 to the landlord. In other words, the
landlord receives the same amount of rent regardless of whether the tenant
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y offering participants choices, the HCV program is designed as a
pathway from low-opportunity to high-opportunity neighborhoods.
Designed this way, voucher holders are uniquely susceptible to source of
income discrimination because the burden is on them to find a landlord who
will accept their voucher. Finding an available unit is typically the most
difficult part of the voucher obstacle course. Where source of income
discrimination is prohibited, the law requires the landlord to accept the
voucher as rental payment if the tenant otherwise qualifies for the unit (i.e.,
may not re ect the tenant because she seeks to pay with a voucher).229
Where source of income discrimination is not prohibited, the landlord may
re ect all vouchers as a blanket policy. In the .S., wages have not kept pace
with the rising cost of housing. Voucher discrimination exacerbates the
extreme affordable housing shortage in many .S. cities, narrowing housing
options and significantly reducing the likelihood that a voucher holder will
find an eligible rental unit.230 Those that do not find a landlord to accept
has a voucher. 24 C.F.R.
982.1 (describing Housing Choice Voucher
Program’s purpose and structure) see also 24 C.F.R. 5.628 982.505(b).
229. A separate challenge riddling many urisdictions is enforcement. Despite longstanding source-of-income discrimination bans, many landlords still exclude
voucher holders in practice. See, e. ., Mary . Cunningham, A Pilot Study of
Landlord Acceptance of Housin Choice ouchers, R AN INST. (2018)
(reporting significant violation rates among landlords).
230. See, e. ., id. see also Martha M. Galve , What Do We Know About Housin Choice
oucher Pro ram Location
utcomes ,
R AN INST. (Aug. 2010),
https: www.urban.org sites default files publication 29176 412218What-Do-We- now-About-Housing-Choice-Voucher-Program-LocationOutcomes-.PDF https: perma.cc 82 Z-H8TG (highlighting the empirical
challenges with placing a voucher in the private market and barriers to using
vouchers in neighborhoods with less concentrated poverty) Alicia Ma ara
rian nudsen, Where Families With Children se Housin
ouchers A
Comparative Look at the Lar est Metropolitan Areas, CTR. ON DGET POL’Y
PRIORITIES ( an. 3, 2019), https: www.cbpp.org research housing wherefamilies-with-children-use-housing-vouchers https: perma.cc 8 Z-T GG
(analy ing voucher outcomes using data from fifty metropolitan areas).
For a discussion of how the Housing Choice Voucher Program was not
designed to address segregation or otherwise deconcentrate poverty, see
Stacy Seicshnaydre, Missed pportunity Furtherin Fair Housin in the
Housin Choice oucher Pro ram, 79 L. CONTEMP. PRO S. 173, 173 74 (2016)
(H D never structured the program to address segregation, deconcentrate
low-income persons, expand housing choice, or further fair housing. . . . ut
the AFFH Rule imposes detailed fair housing planning obligations on public
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their voucher lose their chance and are unlikely to get another one. In other
words, voucher discrimination is one example of how landlords limit
neighborhood choice and undermine the effectiveness of the HCV program.
Prohibiting source of income discrimination opens rental opportunities
in otherwise difficult-to-reach communities, and beyond povertyconcentrated neighborhoods often saturated with vouchers.231 In that
regard, it has the potential to be a useful tool to advance integration.
Moreover, it is a necessary public policy correction. Voucher discrimination
indisputably undermines the HCV program’s effectiveness. Thus, beyond its
integration benefits, banning source of income discrimination would have
the practical impact of enhancing how the voucher program itself operates,
as the programs arguably most notorious shortcoming is the lack of
landlords accepting vouchers on the private rental market.232
4. Viability of Reform
In today’s political climate, it is easy to dismiss as impractical or illtimed any call for congressional action. Cogni ant of political realities, this
Section takes a hard look at critiques, with a focus on (1) political will and
(2) H D’s capacity to enforce a robust AFFH mandate. ltimately, advocates
must be poised to sei e the moment of opportunity when it arrives. To
dismantle segregation, a campaign to amend the Act must be a top

housing authorities that administer voucher programs. These obligations
provide the potential, yet again, for the HCV Program to achieve its intended
purpose and expand housing choices for all. ).
231. See Final Rule, Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System sing
Small Area Fair Market Rents in the Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead
of the Current 50th Percentile FMRs, 81 Fed. Reg. 80,567, 80,567 (Nov. 16,
2016) (implementing new payment standard options using rents calculated
for ip codes within a metropolitan area, instead of a metropolitan-wide
standard). The Small Area Fair Market Rent standard, coupled with source of
income discrimination prohibitions, has the potential to significantly improve
mobility opportunities.
232. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 230. For a discussion on the effectiveness of
mobility programs at advancing fair housing ob ectives, see Will Fischer,
Research Shows Housin ouchers Reduce Hardship and Provide Platform for
Lon term Gains Amon Children, CTR. ON DGET POL’Y PRIORITIES 4 5 (Oct. 7,
2015), https: www.cbpp.org research housing research-shows-housingvouchers-reduce-hardship-and-provide-platform-for-long-term
https: perma.cc EH2-5T52 Chetty et al., supra note 222.
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legislative priority, one worth waging regardless of the precise day the
opportunity arises.
The question of whether a statutory amendment is a viable strategy is
foundational. Embedded are questions of political will and the risks
inherent to reopening any law to amendment. This Article argues that
advocates should pursue a dual-track approach. Advocates should
undoubtedly continue to defend AFFH progress, such as pursuing the APA
litigation to stop rollback of the AFFH Rule featured as a case study in Part
II.
Nevertheless, advocates must know their next hand. When the political
winds shift, advocates will need to know where to press and how. For
instance, they need to be prepared to offer effective amendments with a
likelihood of success in advancing AFFH ob ectives particularly those
aimed at correcting fundamental design flaws described in Part II that will
instantiate a durable culture of local compliance.
In Stamped from the Be innin , author Ibram . endi reminds us that
racist progress has consistently followed racial progress. 233 This
framework is helpful not only for tracing the history of what he calls a dual
and dueling history of racial progress and the simultaneous progress of
racism. 234 It is likewise helpful to look at the AFFH mandate’s history as a
microcosm of this greater trend. First, there was the achievement of the
Act’s very passage, then decades of racist stalling, then promulgation of a
regulation that was radical 235 to some but definitively pragmatic to
others that represented more progress, and then there was a systematic
attempt to dismantle it. That brings us to this moment. A prominent
progressive lawmaker has described our country’s pattern of progressive
progress as a series of short-lived burst s of activity on civil and social
rights with profound, impact, but ones that are typically followed by
longer intervals in which the progressive accomplishments must be
defended vigilantly until the next progressive burst.236

233. Ibram . endi, STAMPED FROM THE

EGINNING xi (2017).

234. d. at x (emphasis omitted).
235. E. ., Stanley urt , Opinion, Massive Government verreach bama s AFFH
Rule is ut, NAT. REV. ( uly 8, 2015), https: www.nationalreview.com
corner massive-government-overreach-obamas-affh-rule-out-stanley-kurt
https: perma.cc C 8-D876 .
236. SHERROD ROWN, DES 88 13 18 (2019) (describing four progressive eras in
.S. politics and the progressive lawmakers who shared his Senate desk
number 88).
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What might we draw from this history Opportunity may be upon us.
The year 2020 brought seismic shifts. In addition to a generation-defining
global pandemic and economic crisis, we are experiencing a new wave of
public outrage at our racist past and present. This may be a new era of public
accountability a time of line-drawing between leaders who support and
those who oppose transformative policies that actually account for racism
and seek to overcome it.
The work will not be in vain. Whether the opportunity to amend
emerges in 2021, it will eventually surface if advocates continue to coalesce
around the bipartisan findings of the National Commission. In other words,
this is a campaign worth waging, and its momentum could influence when
the moment of opportunity arises.237
Related is whether reopening the Act might backfire by exposing it to
poison pill amendments or otherwise compromise its enforcement
mechanisms. Two points warrant mention. First, that is always a risk. ut,
it is a risk that advocates routinely manage through coordination with
caucus and floor leaders to set parameters on prospective amendments that
warrant pulling the bill. Advocates should define the boundaries, backed by
specific examples of how anticipated amendments would undermine the
Act. Second, we must consider the baseline from which to measure risk. In
the case of the AFFH mandate, there is only so far to fall. While there is some
risk the mandate could be removed, it’s unlikely. In other words, there is
only room for improvement. The bigger risk is to the anti-discrimination
provisions the provisions that define what discriminatory practices
violate the Act and how they may be enforced. For instance, opponents
might undermine enforcement mechanisms by limiting damages or other
relief, or gut discriminatory effect theories of liability disparate impact
and segregative effect. These risks are real, but they relate back to the first
point. As with any legislative battle, there are pitfalls and traps to be
anticipated and strategically managed. Extant risk is no reason to disregard
the acute need for amendment.
One hopeful development is growing bipartisan support for housing
mobility programs.238 In February 2019, Congress passed and President
237. For a discussion of the political maneuvering that resulted in the 1988 Fair
Housing Amendments Act, see MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at 209 10.
238. See, e. ., Clinton ones, Chief Hous. Ins. Counsel to House Fin. Services Comm.
(Ma ority), Remarks to Conference Panel 4: Funding Housing Mobility,
Seventh Annual Conference on Housing Mobility (October 16-17, 2018)
(notes on file with author) (conference hosted by the Poverty Race Research
Action Council, MobilityWorks, and the Council of Large Public Housing
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Trump signed a final fiscal year 2019 budget appropriating $28 million for
a mobility demonstration pro ect.239 This is the first time Congress has
funded a housing mobility initiative since the early 1990s.240 One reason
Authorities) (panelists: Clinton ones ennifer Sharpiro, Chief of Staff to
Congressman Emanuel Cleaver arolina Arias, Policy Advisor to Senator
Chris Van Hollen panel moderated by arbara Sard of the Center for udget
and
Policy
Priorities). Conference program available at
https: prrac.org mobility2018 housingmobilityprogram2018.pdf
https: perma.cc F9 3-3LLL see also Powell et al., supra note 222
( Mobility approaches have quietly gained ground in recent decades,
especially in light of the failure of public housing policies that exacerbated
racial segregation while consigning residents to bleak environments of
concentrated poverty. ).
239. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116 6, 133 Stat. 13, 438
Alison ell, H D Fundin Bill Will Launch Housin
oucher Mobility
Demonstration, CTR. ON
DGET
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 15, 2019),
https: www.cbpp.org blog hud-funding-bill-will-launch-housing-vouchermobility-demonstration https: perma.cc G54 -SA4
(discussing the
housing mobility bill from 2017-2018 that was replicated in the final budget
agreement for fiscal year 2019). Similarly, Congress appropriated an
additional $25 million for a mobility demonstration pro ect for fiscal year
2020. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, Div.
H, Tit. II, 133 Stat. 2534, 2980 (2020) (allocating $28 million for mobility
demonstration to enable PHAs to administer the HCV program in a manner
that encourages families with children to move to lower-poverty areas and
expand access to opportunity) see also Althea Arnold, Con ress Reaches FY
Spendin Deal with ncreased Fundin for Affordable Housin , NAT’L
CO NCIL OF STATE HO S. AGENCIES (Dec. 17, 2019), https: www.ncsha.org
blog congress-reaches-fy-2020-spending-deal-with-increased-funding-foraffordable-housing https: perma.cc 36WA-DTC4 (describing the $25
million federal investment in voucher mobility programs, which includes $20
million to be competitively awarded to public housing agencies for mobilityrelated services and $5 million for new vouchers, in addition to $23.8 billion
for voucher renewals) Douglas Rice, House Bill ncludes Ma or nvestments to
Help Families Pay Rent, CTR. ON DGET POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 22, 2019),
https: www.cbpp.org blog house-bill-includes-ma or-investments-to(discussing the
help-families-pay-rent https: perma.cc 9APP- NE
benefits of the mobility program).
240. Some advocates may recall that the federal government previously funded a
pilot pro ect, Moving to Opportunity ( MTO ) in the 1990s. Many observers
have critici ed MTO for failing to produce evidence that mobility improves
outcomes. However, t here was nothing wrong with the earlier round of
MTO evaluations in themselves: the main problem was that the positive
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mobility programs garner bipartisan support harkens back to The
Opportunity Agenda’s messaging it is a commonly held and widely shared
value that a child’s life opportunities should not be determined by the ip
code in which they live.241
These developments give reason for hope that similar bipartisan
inroads can be made under the auspices of increasing access to opportunity,
especially in light of promising research demonstrating the significant
benefits to low-income children who relocate to high-opportunity
neighborhoods, particularly in terms of academic achievement, postsecondary education attendance, future employment, and breaking the
cycle of generational poverty.242 Thus, there is room for hope, even in a
fractured Congress.
Finally, a look back to 1988 is a reminder that the Fair Housing Act has
a bipartisan history. It was passed and amended during contentious
times, the result of cross-aisle brokering. Indeed, that rancor produced lessthan-desirable legislation, but it was nonetheless a step forward that
effects of leaving poor neighborhoods as a child could not be observed until
the children were old enough to finish college and enter the adult labor
market. onathan Rothwell, Sociolo y s Reven e Movin to pportunity
M
Revisited,
ROO INGS
INST.
(May
6,
2015),
https: www.brookings.edu blog social-mobility-memos 2015 05 06
sociologys-revenge-moving-to-opportunity-mto-revisited
https: perma.cc 4ML3-DAZ5 . New research establishes that the place
where children are raised generally and mobility programs specifically
make a measurable difference. See Chetty et al., supra note 37 Chetty
Hendren, supra note 37.
New mobility programs nonetheless draw lessons from MTO. Modern
mobility programs incorporate pre-move and post-move counseling to help
participants through the sometimes-rocky transition to an unfamiliar new
neighborhood.
241. See supra note 238. Countless statements across the political spectrum
reinforce this message. See, e. ., Secretary etsy DeVos (@ etsyDeVosED),
TWITTER (Feb. 28, 2017 10:29 PM)
https: twitter.com betsydevosed status 836780493064581120
https: perma.cc PZ8-FG Z ( No child, regardless of their ZIP code or
family income, should be denied access to quality education. ) ill Chappell
Scott Neuman, Who is Ale andria casio Corte , NAT’L P . RADIO ( une 27,
2018), https: www.npr.org 2018 06 27 623752094 who-is-alexandriaocasio-corte https: perma.cc 4N P-Y N5 ( I was born in a place where
your ZIP code determines your destiny. ) (quoting .S. Rep. Alexandria
Ocasio-Corte ).
242. See Chetty et al., supra note 37 Chetty
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produced at least some meaningful results. In the case of 1988, legislators
of both parties understood the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1968
Act were glaringly defective.243
Despite rancor and partisan divide, Congress passed and President
Reagan signed the Fair Housing Amendments Act.244 Advocates told a
successful narrative: the compromise original Act needed effective
enforcement mechanisms. Today, advocates have a parallel case: the AFFH
mandate needs meaningful enforcement mechanisms. As currently
configured, the mandate has little likelihood of reducing segregation.
ltimately, the lessons of 1988 may prove instructive for today’s advocates.
Likewise, fair housing advocates and opponents alike question whether
H D has the capacity to meaningfully enforce a robust AFFH mandate. The
critique is valid and not lost on H D. There is long-running consensus that
H D is understaffed.245 Each of the three investigative reports into AFFH
compliance underscored the problem.
In 2008, the National Commission observed:
H D has chronically understaffed its fair housing enforcement, and
many staff are poorly trained and directed about how to accomplish
243. E. ., MASSEY
DENTON, supra note 1, at 210 ( In one bold stroke, the
amendments remedied the principal flaws of the 1968 act that had been so
well documented in two decades of Congressional hearings, court cases,
government reports, and academic treatises. ).
244. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
3601 19 (2017)). For a play-by-play of
(codified as amended at 42 .S.C.
the FHAA’s procedural history, see MASSEY DENTON, supra note 1, at 208 10
Ware, supra note 211 at 83 87 (1993) (detailing bipartisan attempts to
amend the Act) see also President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, (Sept. 13, 1988),
https: www.reaganlibrary.gov archives speech remarks-signing-fairhousing-amendments-act-1988 https: perma.cc N7A-MVS7 134 CONG.
REC. S12449-02 (Sept. 14, 1988) (Senator ennedy responding to President
Reagan’s signing statement).
245. One proposal that warrants additional consideration is separating H D’s civil
rights enforcement branch the Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity Office
from H D’s hydra. It could, for instance, exist as a stand-alone agency akin to
the .S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Such an agency
would be responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it unlawful to
discriminate against a person in the provision of housing because of the
person’s race, color, national origin, religion, sex, disability, or familial status.
The comparative benefits of a separate agency, and how the agency might
enforce the AFFH mandate, are the sub ect of a forthcoming article.
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fair housing enforcement. At least 750 full-time equivalent
employees (FTEs) are necessary for the existing fair housing work
alone. H D’s staffing of the entire Office of Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity (FHEO) office, which has responsibility for
enforcement as well as program compliance monitoring, has not
reached that staffing level since FY 1994. At 579 FTEs in FY 2007,
the staffing numbers for FHEO are wholly inadequate and at their
lowest since 1989.246
The 2010 GAO report concurred, noting that H D officials blamed
inadequate staffing for their limited oversight capacity.247 H D’s 2009
internal study found the same.248 Nevertheless, the trend continued for
another decade.249 In 2019, the fair housing office had 430 full-time
246. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 17 NAT’L FAIR HO S. ALL.,
MA ING EVERY NEIGH ORHOOD A PLACE OF OPPORT NITY: 2018 FAIR HO SING TRENDS
REPORT 93 98 (2018), https: nationalfairhousing.org wp-content uploads
2018 04 NFHA-2018-Fair-Housing-Trends-Report 4-30-18.pdf
https: perma.cc 9T7 -4PT5 (advocating increased funding for H D’s Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity Office to enhance its capacity to hold grantees
accountable for AFFH compliance).
247. GAO REPORT, supra note 103, at 25.
248. H D ST DY, supra note 113, at 26 see also Reconstructin Fair Housin , NAT’L
CO NCIL ON DISA ILITY 7 (Nov. 6, 2001), https: ncd.gov rawmedia repository
https: perma.cc 4RP8c8b3f693 4dbb 482d 92c7 b16d37858b4c.pdf
3M L (reporting on H D’s chronic understaffing and inadequate staff
training) id. at 8 ( This report concludes that H D has ma or challenges ahead
of it to fulfill the promise of civil rights enforcement. Without staffing and
funding resources, progress cannot and will not be made. ) N ATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 17 (documenting a staff of 579
employees in 2007, down from 750 in 1994).
249. Alec MacGillis, s Anybody Home at H D , PROP LICA (Aug. 22, 2017),
https: www.propublica.org article is-anybody-home-at-hud-secretaryben-carson https: perma.cc R5D3- WLG (counting H D’s overall ranks
at 8,000 employees, approximately half of the 16,000 employees decades
earlier) see also Tracy an, Ben Carson s H D Political Loyalty Re uired, o
POST
(Sept.
20,
2018),
E perience
ecessary,
WASH.
https: www.washingtonpost.com business economy ben-carsons-hudpolitical-loyalty-required-no-experience-necessary 2018 09 20 addb8e749b0c-11e8-b60b-1c897f17e185 story.html noredirect
on utm term .8ae185c7577f https: perma.cc 7 F-H S ( The lack of
experience in a chronically understaffed agency brought even routine work to
a halt for much of Carson’s first year at H D because none of the appointees
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equivalent employees, or about fifty-seven percent of the staff level
recommended by the National Commission before implementation of the
new AFFH Rule.250
H D is well aware of the problem. It explicitly acknowledged in the
AFFH rulemaking process that it would need to expand staffing levels to
provide technical support for AFH review.251 Indeed, its final rule even
included specific costs estimates to hire staff to implement the rule ,
provide data support , and review submitted AFHs. 252 Other
contemporaneous documents confirm that H D planned staff increases and
training and as a part of its rulemaking process, anticipating the need to
scale up technical assistance, especially during the early years of the
learning curve.253 In short, H D has always known that more robust
enforcement would require more resources.
Since the Rule’s release, scholars continue to emphasi e the correlation
between H D resources and meaningful AFFH enforcement,254 particularly
for smaller and under-resourced communities with greater need for H D’s
technical assistance. They are more dependent on H D’s guidance to
identify and overcome fair housing barriers.255 In short, those scholars
observed, local governments are waiting to see if H D will be a true partner
to grantees in reali ing the benefits of the AFFH Rule.256
Nevertheless, several considerations suggest H D’s capacity does not
wholly undercut the AFFH Rule. First, the administrative record shows that

felt comfortable signing off on grants and technical guidance, according to
career staffers. ).
250.

.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 134, at 234 35 (compiling
testimony on H D’s limited workforce and civil rights enforcement capacity).

251. E. ., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,350 ( uly
16, 2015).
252. d.
253. In its notice of a final rule, H D acknowledged its anticipated challenges with
respect to scaling staffing and other resources to provide adequate technical
assistance and AFH review. See Final Rule, Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,350 ( uly 16, 2015) ( H D itself will need to
hire staff to implement the rule provide data support and review submitted
AFHs ) see also ostic Acolin, supra note 52, at 201 02 (describing H D’s
approach in the final rule).
254. See, e. ., ostic

Acolin, supra note 52, at 201 02.

255. d.
256. d.
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H D has always anticipated its need to scale upward as it rolls out the AFFH
Rule. It is not a revelation that H D has been planning to make internal
changes to account for new demands. Second, H D has strategies to
cultivate a culture of local AFFH compliance. In addition to staggering
submissions, H D could randomi e which submissions it reviews and
which urisdictions receive more intensive technical assistance in the early
months and years of AFFH rollout. In short, lack of capacity alone does not
handcuff H D from taking meaningful steps to enforce the AFFH Rule.
Finally, even in an administration that has not prioriti ed H D funding,257
the fair housing office has been increasing staff during 2018 2020.258
Viewed another way, even assuming H D does not have the current
capacity to enforce an AFFH regulation to the fullest, it has the potential. We
cannot know whether it will rise to the occasion until the opportunity
arrives.
B.

oluntary Measures

Absent statutory amendment, or in the interim, advocates have other
options to affirmatively further fair housing: State and local governments
can voluntarily pursue their own AFFH policies.
The proposals discussed in this Section are separate and independent
of federal authority. As such, they would not directly implicate federal
grants, but they are promising for other arguably superior reasons.
Where federalism leaves state and local governments to impose their own
legal mandates, particularly in the areas of community development like
oning policy, such proposals are less likely to raise the same concerns
about top-down control as federal mandates. They may be better tailored to
the unique urisdiction, and the very process of enacting these measures
would generate and demonstrate a degree of local support.
Nothing in federal law prohibits states and localities from pursuing
their own AFFH mandates. Federal prohibitions restrict federal (not local)

257. E. ., Administration Proposes to Cut H D udget by $8.6 illion, AFFORDA LE
HO SING FINANCE (Feb. 10, 2020), https: www.housingfinance.com finance
administration-proposes-to-cut-hud-budget-by-8-6-billion o
https: perma.cc 5C2 -Z 9 (reflecting a proposed 15 percent reduction).
258. Anna Maria Farias, Assistant Sec’y, Fair Hous. Equal Opportunity, Dep’t of
Hous.
rban Dev., Remarks to Annual Symposium Fair Housing 2019
New Challenges or More of the Same , at the niversity of Illinois-Chicago
ohn Marshall Law School (September 5, 2019) (noting that H D had added
over 100 FHEO employees across the country) (notes on file with author).
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authority from rewriting local oning and similar regulations.259 Similarly,
it is unlikely that any ideologically motivated anti-AFFH rulemaking
would or legally could impinge on state or local authority to establish
new local AFFH standards. Moreover, practically, AFFH opponents’
deregulatory approach has entailed removing federal involvement for the
sake of increasing local control, not restricting it.260
A state local approach risks lack of uniformity and federal
accountability. However, these proposals provide a backstop during periods
of federal hostility to fair housing. They are therefore best seen as an
alternative option to a H D-promulgated AFFH rule. Ideally, Congress
would set the gold standard through statutory amendment that allows
states and localities flexibility to customi e their AFFH procedures after
satisfying minimum federal standards.
This Section looks at two existing models, but the possibilities are as
broad as a community is creative.261 These models are recent developments
that appear to have been prompted by the federal government’s AFFH
hostility under the Trump Administration.
The first model is a state statute, illustrated by California’s AFFH law.262
The second model is voluntary completion of the AFH (even though it is no
longer required) and incorporation of the AFH results into comprehensive
planning documents. Several cities have already conducted or are
considering AFHs as the time comes to renew their planning documents.
Among them are oston, the District of Columbia, and New Orleans.263
259. See, e. ., Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice, 85 Fed. Reg.
47,899, 47,903 (Aug. 7, 2020) (citing 42 .S.C. 12711).
260. See, e. ., id. at 47,900.
261. The unleashed potential of state and local AFFH mandates is the sub ect of a
forthcoming article.
262. California Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Act, Assembly ill 686 (Sept.
30, 2018) (to be codified at 2 CAL. GOV’T CODE 65583) (establishing a duty to
affirmatively further fair housing under California state law).
263. See, e. ., Hearin Before the Subcomm. on Civil Ri hts & Civil Liberties of the H.
Comm. on versi ht & Reform, 116th Cong. (2020) (Testimony of Ellen Lee,
Director of Community and Economic Development for the City of New
Orleans),
https: oversight.house.gov legislation hearings a-threat-toamerica-s-children-the-trump-administration-s-proposal-to-gut-fair
https: perma.cc L7Z -428 (video of testimony beginning at minute
32:00). A critical mass of additional urisdictions are now adopting the AFH
template, including the State of Delaware, the State of Connecticut, Orange
County, California, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul Twin Cities metropolitan
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oston has gone a step further. Its City Council has pledged to adopt a firstin-the-nation oning amendment requiring policymakers to conduct an
analysis of barriers to fair housing as a part of its oning approval
process.264
Given these models, this Section focuses on how fair housing advocates
might appeal to local grantees to voluntarily adopt one of these models by
appealing to the urisdiction’s (1) self-interest and (2) fundamental shared
values, even though not required by federal law. Specifically, this Article
proposes that advocates employ strategic opportunity messaging, directed
at local planners who influence AFFH decisions. Advocates might use these
tools in traditional state and local lobbying efforts, ballot referenda, or

region, aton Rouge, Louisiana, and a number of counties surrounding the
District of Columbia (Arlington, Alexandria, Fairfax, Prince William, Loudoun,
and Montgomery Counties). See, e. ., Regional Fair Housing Pro ect Team,
Metropolitan
Washington
Council
of
Governments,
https: www.mwcog.org committees regional-fair-housing-pro ect-team
https: perma.cc 99TZ-H4ZN (discussing a multi- urisdiction regional AFH
approach) Prince William County Staff Report and Proposed Resolution on
an Intergovernmental Collaboration Agreement to fulfill its AFFH duties,
available
at
https: eservice.pwcgov.org documents bocs agendas
2020 0922 5-C.pdf https: perma.cc 9HPR- WD3 (describing the nature
of the analysis to fair housing impediments and desire to gather and examine
data for patterns of racial bias and segregation even though it is no longer
required under federal law). These themes also arose in conversations with
fair housing advocates. E. ., Interview with Nadine Cohen, Managing Att’y,
Greater os. Legal Servs. ( une 25, 2020) (notes on file with author).
264. See Boston Commits to First in the ation onin Amendment Proposed by
Councilor Lydia Edwards, EAST OSTON TIMES-FREE PRESS, une 24, 2020,
https: eastietimes.com 2020 06 24 boston-commits-to-first-in-thenation- oning-amendment-proposed-by-councilor-lydia-edwards
https: perma.cc Y5 6-M LF . This work is a result of a years-long effort by
the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Community Advisory Committee in
partnership with and consistent advocacy by a diverse coalition of
stakeholders. See Telephone Interview with Nadine Cohen, Managing Att’y,
Greater os. Legal Servs. ( une 25, 2020) Nadine Cohen, Presentation to Fair
Housing Conference San Diego (Feb. 14, 2020) (notes on file with author).
In New York, under Governor Andrew Cuomo’s statewide Fair Housing
Matters NY program, the state is pressing forward with local data collection
every three to five years as required under the AFFH Rule. See, e. ., Matthew
Chayes, State Asks Public to Complete Fair Housin Surveys, NEWSWEE ( uly 13,
2020),
https: www.newsday.com long-island fair-housing-segregationcuomo-surveys-1.46818103 https: perma.cc 74DV-FE 3 .
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training at annual fair housing conferences for local planners, among other
efforts. This Article is cogni ant that voluntary measures may produce more
modest results than federal reform. ut all local progress contributes to
building a culture of AFFH compliance. This Section explores messages most
likely to stimulate local commitment.
For the past decade, The Opportunity Agenda which describes itself
as an intersectional communication lab 265 that studies how to tell
compelling stories about issues of national importance has studied
messaging about the AFFH mandate.266 Its research reveals effective ways
to engage various audiences on the issue of how to use local government
processes to decrease residential segregation, focused on core values. The
cornerstone of its approach is educating its audience of the importance of
place in determining life outcomes, because where one lives is correlated
with opportunity.267 This tactic helps local decision-makers understand not
only their considerable influence but the cause-effect relationship between
local land use, oning, and related decisions and quality of life.268 From
there, the messaging focuses on policies that promote opportunity, with
emphasis on common values.269 This Section contends that fair housing
advocates and strategic partners can use this messaging at fair housing
trainings to show local decision-makers how they can use AFFH tools
regardless of whether the federal government requires them to improve
outcomes for their unique communities, particularly when they understand

265. THE
OPPORT NITY
AGENDA,
https: perma.cc A4 4- E G .

https: www.opportunityagenda.org

266. E. ., E pandin pportunity alkin about H D s Affirmatively Furtherin Fair
OPPORT NITY
AGENDA
(2017),
Housin
Re ulations,
THE
https: www.opportunityagenda.org sites default files 2017https: perma.cc R 7W-N9
03 Expanding 20Opportunity.pdf
(hereinafter E pandin
pportunity) Reali in the Promise How to
Affirmatively Further Fair Housin , THE OPPORT NITY AGENDA (Nov. 2014),
https: www.opportunityagenda.org sites default files 2018-04
2014.11.10 reali ing the promise final.pdf
https: perma.cc S4WN5GYR The Opportunity Agenda, Reformin H D s Re ulations to Affirmatively
Further Fair Housin (March 2010), https: www.opportunityagenda.org
sites default files 2017-03 2010.03ReformingH DRegulations.pdf
https: perma.cc 9 4 -4MPP .
267. E pandin

pportunity, supra note 266, at 4.

268. E. ., id. at 9.
269. d. at 1, 2, and 6.
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the staggering costs of segregation on quality of life and other costly
government services.
Opportunity Agenda identifies six core themes.270 This Article focuses
on the three likely to resonate with local decision-makers: (1) opportunity
for all, (2) a tool to combat growing inequality, and (3) accountability and
the public trust.
The first theme opportunity for all draws on commonly held belief
of equal access to opportunity.271 The message is that where you live has a
significant impact on your life, such as quality schools or transportation or
obs, factors that vary dramatically by neighborhood. The purpose of the
AFFH is to broaden access to opportunity to all people regardless of race
or ethnicity.272
The second theme is that the AFFH Rule is a tool for local governments
to combat growing inequality.273 It emphasi es America’s growing racial
and ethnic inequality, an alarming trend that shows unequal opportunity is
spreading, not decreasing.274 It underscores the unique influence local
leaders wield with respect to barriers to opportunity, not ust intentional
bigotry but bad local policies or practices.275
Finally, the third theme is about accountability and the public trust. The
message is that local entities that ask for federal taxpayer funds for housing
and community development pro ects have an obligation to administer
those funds with an eye toward expanding opportunity, not limiting it. It
means that funding recipients make an informed choice: accept federal
funds, which come with planning tools and data, in exchange for the promise
that the community will consider fair housing in their development and
takes steps to reduce barriers to housing opportunity.
270. d. at 3 5.
271. d. at 3.
272. d.
273. d. at 3 4 see also Orfield Stancil, supra note 34 (discussing the economic
self-interest of communities to reduce residential segregation) ( This all
echoes a deeper truth: Racially segregated regions don’t work. They’re
politically and economically unstable. They result in societies where people
can’t understand each other or work together. Research shows that
segregation can create and reinforce stereotypes and that it erodes people’s
ability to interact across racial lines. Segregated cities are more likely to
produce racism not ust within the police force but throughout any political or
civic institution with power. ).
274. E pandin
275. d.
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These themes provide a foundation to approach local decision-makers,
many of whom are largely unaware of the purpose or function of the AFFH
mandate. Voluntary compliance is more likely where the local
decisionmaker understands the unique opportunities the AFFH mandate
presents. sing the AFFH Rule (2015) as a proxy, Opportunity Agenda
suggests nine opportunity themes.276 Among them are: deeper local
understanding (by using data, helping urisdictions understand local
conditions in terms of access to schools, obs, transportation, and a healthy
environment), local flexibility (providing a stronger analytical framework
that highlights which issues to examine without dictating a one-si e-fits-all
approach to planning), and better coordination (drawing connections
between a urisdiction’s fair housing priorities with its other development
resources like its Consolidated Plan or other broader regional issues like
transportation or infrastructure).277
Connecting these messages to outcomes, advocates might ask
decisionmakers to adopt a formal AFFH mandate for their urisdiction. The
primary example is California’s AFFH mandate, which went into effect in
2019.278 Similar to the federal AFFH Rule, the law creates a statewide
affirmative fair housing obligation to address segregation, defining the
phrase affirmatively further fair housing to require meaningful actions to
overcome patterns of segregation and foster inclusive communities free
from barriers that restrict access to opportunity for communities of color
and other persons protected by state law.279 It requires all levels of state
and local government and public housing authorities to administer their
housing and community development programs in a way that affirmatively
furthers fair housing and requires that the obligation be interpreted
consistent with the federal AFFH Rule as promulgated in 2015.280
Additionally, California requires every urisdiction to include a Housing
Element in its local development plan, which includes an analysis of both
segregation and residential displacement.281 This is a requirement that any
276. d. at 9.
277. d.
278. California Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Act, Assembly ill 686 (Sept.
30, 2018) (to be codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE 65583, 8899.50) see Renee M.
Williams, Affirmatively Further Fair Housin California s Response to a
Chan in Federal Landscape, 28 . AFFORDA LE HO S. CMTY. DEV. L. 387 (2019).
279. CAL. GOV’T CODE 8899.50(a)(1) (West 2020)
280. CAL. GOV’T CODE 65583 (West 2020)
281. d.
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state or local urisdiction could add to its existing planning process, unless
otherwise prohibited by state law.
A second option that does not necessarily require a legislative vote is
for a urisdiction to voluntary adopt new planning protocols that explicitly
consider AFFH elements. Three strategies are likely to be the most
effective.282 First, urisdictions should voluntarily complete the Assessment
of Fair Housing process outlined in the AFFH Rule, rather than a mere
Analysis of Impediments. This entails using the Assessment Tools and H Dsupplied data to undergo a more thoughtful and customi ed analysis of
impediments in that urisdiction.283 Second, urisdictions should explicitly
incorporate their fair housing goals into their Consolidated Plans or PHA
Plans for coordinated planning that reflects fair housing priorities. Third,
urisdictions should measure and publicly report progress and lack of
progress toward meeting their AFFH goals.
The best methods for disseminating these messages is beyond the scope
of this Article. As previewed above, legislative lobbying efforts, state or local
ballot referenda, conferences or local planners, or continuing education
programs are potential entry points to attract local interest. State and local
governments are classic laboratories for local experimentation, and they
present at least some opportunity to see how AFFH-focused planning
results in better outcomes and long-term cost savings. At the same time,
advocates must remain mindful that, historically, local compliance has not
been forthcoming. As this Article states in the introduction: progress must
occur at the local level, but history has proven that local compliance often
requires federal pressure and accountability. Accordingly, state and local
measures present opportunity, but they cannot be the stopping point.

282. For policy recommendations based on current trends in fair housing, see
NAT’L FAIR HO S. ALL., supra note 246, at 93.
283. Some urisdictions are leading by example, preparing the equivalent of the
enhanced Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) instead of an Analysis of
Impediments. See, e. ., Washington, D.C. Fair Housing Analysis, POVERTY RACE
RESEARCH ACTION CO NCIL (2019) https: prrac.org washington-dc-fairhttps: perma.cc 8N5E-DG4Y (prepared by a
housing-analysis-2019
collaboration of the Poverty
Race Research Action Council, Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights nder Law and D.C. Department of Housing and
Community Development) see also Hearin Before the Subcomm. on Civil
Ri hts & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on versi ht & Reform, supra note 263
(testimony of Ellen Lee on the experience of New Orleans with the AFH
process and the voluntary steps it is taking to carry out is AFH goals).
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CONCL SION
The AFFH mandate the car nobody knew how to drive is a one-of-akind civil rights directive requiring the federal government and its grantees
to take affirmative steps to deconstruct the segregation the government
built.284 It languished nearly fifty years before H D paid it meaningful
attention. The resulting 2015 AFFH Rule was a vital step that illustrates what
can and must be done to make progress against housing segregation. ut the
2020 repeal of the AFFH Rule has set advocates back, potentially decades. Its
repeal illustrates the vulnerability of any AFFH regulation.
To be effective, the contours of the AFFH mandate should be
memoriali ed in statute. This Article makes the case for amending the Fair
Housing Act to give meaning to the AFFH mandate by establishing an
accountability framework and creating a private right of action as a backstop
to government inaction. The time is upon us. The stage is set for fair housing’s
third act.

284. Hannah- ones, supra note 8 (quoting a senior fair housing official on the lack
of AFFH guidance within H D).
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